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THE CHILDREN OF BABY M.
J. HERBIE DIFONzo & RUTH C. STERN

I.

INTRODUCTION

If "all new technology creates a lacuna in social thought," legal
thought is even less adept at navigating novelty's pitfalls.' Because the
law is not in the habit of anticipating social and technological changes, it
approaches them with caution and skepticism. Courts proceed by carving
out easements in the unfamiliar terrain. Eventually, the law evolves a set
of principles for analyzing and accommodating new scientific and social
practices. Often, by the time this occurs, society has embraced, rejected, or
2
become inured to the innovation and moved on to the next one.
We have come to expect that technology will outpace the law's ability
to comprehend it and regulate it. This lag time is not necessarily harmful;
it allows new trends to take root in the culture, to reveal how they operate,
and to expose their benefits and limitations, as well as areas needing
further study. As Elizabeth Scott noted, the making of law and policy in a
climate of controversy and "intense political pressure will seldom promote
society's long-term interests."3 At the same time, an awareness of
innovation and its influence on cultural norms is what keeps the judicial
and legislative processes relevant and vital. We do not ask courts to
sanction every new idea that comes along; we ask only that when novel

Copyright © 2011, J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stem.
. J. Herbie DiFonzo, Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of
Law, Hofstra University Law School, lawjhd@hofstra.edu; Ruth C. Stern, J.D., M.S.W.,
independent researcher and writer, branwell226@msn.com. We thank Patricia Kasting for
her skill in locating every source we needed, and we thank Joanna Grossman for the idea
that it is high time that Baby M be reconsidered. An embryonic version of this article was
presented at the Sixth Annual Wells Conference on Adoption Law, Capital University, in
March 2010.
1 Bernard E. Rollin, Telos, Value, and Genetic Engineering, in Is HUMAN NATURE
OBSOLETE? GENETICS, BIOENGINEERING, AND THE FUTURE OF THE HuMAN CONDrrION 317,

335 (Harold W. Baillie & Timothy K. Casey eds., 2005).
2 See Elizabeth Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110-11 (2009) (showing that this has occurred with surrogacy
arrangements because both politicians and the judiciary realized that these arrangements are
here to stay).
'Id. at 145.
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issues do arise, they not take refuge in unproven assumptions and outdated
precedent.
Twenty-one years-the span of a near generation-separate the New
Jersey court cases of In re Baby M ,4decided by the state's supreme court
in 1988, and A.G.R. v. D.R.H. and S.H.,5 a trial court decision from 2009.
Both cases roundly repudiated surrogacy contracts as void and
unenforceable.6 In Baby M, William Stern contracted with a surrogate,
Mary Beth Whitehead, to be artificially inseminated with his sperm and to
bear a child for him and his wife Elizabeth. Whitehead further agreed to
surrender the child to the Stems for adoption. Finding it impossible to
comply with the contract, Whitehead suffered an emotional crisis and
absconded with the baby, Melissa, returning her to the Sterns only by court
order and after arrest.9 The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's validation of the contract and authorization of Melissa's adoption
by the Sterns.'o In doing so, the supreme court not only declared the
contract invalid but also pronounced it evil:
It guarantees the separation of a child from its mother; it
looks to adoption, regardless of suitability; it totally
ignores the child; it takes the child from the mother
regardless of her wishes and her maternal fitness; and it
does all of this, it accomplishes all of its goals, through the
use of money."
Numerous amici curiae joined in support of Whitehead, several
prominent feminists among them.12 Confronting a divisive issue and a
relatively uncommon reproductive practice, Baby M was very much a
creature of its time.'
The decision deplored the commodification of
children, the treatment of women's bodies as "childbearing factories,"l 4

537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
s No. FD-09-1838-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009), available at http://
graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20091231_SURROGATE.pdf.
6
Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234; A.G.R., No. FD-09-1838-07, at *5-6.
Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235.
4

9 Id.at 1236-37.

'old. at 1234.
" Id.at 1250.
12Scott, supra note 2, at 116.
1 Id. at 109.
14 Id. at 112.
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and the way in which surrogacy "degraded the mother-child relationship by
paying women not to bond with their children."1
The later case, A.G.R. v. D.R.H. and S.H., concerned a gay male
couple, Donald and Sean Hollingsworth, who legally married in California
and registered their domestic partnership in New Jersey.16 The surrogate,
Angelia Robinson (Donald's sister), agreed to carry eggs from an
anonymous donor that were fertilized by Sean's sperm.
After giving
birth to twins, Robinson claimed entitlement to the status of parent.18 In
voiding the surrogacy contract and granting parental status to Robinson,
the court relied almost exclusively on Baby M.'9 The fact that Robinson,
unlike Whitehead, was genetically unrelated to the twins was, for the court,
"a distinction without a difference significant enough to take the instant
matter out of Baby M."2 0
The court in A.G.R. appeared oblivious to the revolution in
reproductive demographics that had occurred since Baby M.21 Many of
these changes were tied to the rise of a thriving industry in assisted
reproductive technology (ART).22 During the last decade of the twentieth
century, the number of gay and lesbian families more than tripled.23 The
birth rate increased for women aged 35 and over, doubled for women aged
40-44, and tripled for women aged 44-49.24 The number of children born
to women aged 50-54 rose from 117 in 1997 to 417 in 2005.25

1s Id.

" A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., No. FD-09-1838-07, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23,
2009).
17Id.

" Id. at 1-2.
'9 Id. at 5-6.
20
Id. at 5.
21 See Janet L. Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus: Reproductive Technology and the
Law,
23 VT. L. REV. 225, 225 (1998) ("The advent and swift expansion of reproductive
technology beginning in the late 1970s accelerated the transformation of the family by
undermining sacred assumptions about the reproductive process.").
22 See Crystal Phend, Rapid Increase Seen in Assisted Reproduction, MEDPAGE TODAY
(May 28, 2009), http://www.medpagetoday.com/OBGYN/Infertility/14405 (reporting a
25.6% jump in the number of ART cycles performed worldwide from 2000 to 2002).
23 DAVID M. SMITH & GARY J. GATES, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, GAY AND LESBIAN
FAMILIES IN THE UNITED STATES: SAME-SEX UNMARRIED PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS 1 (2001),

availableat http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000491_gl_partner-households.pdf.
24 Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2005, NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS
Dec. 5, 2007, at 8, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/
nvsr56 06.pdf.
25 Id.
REPORTS,
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Collaborative reproduction, with its constellation of sperm, egg and
embryo donors, and gestational carriers had transformed the concept of
legal parentage.26 No Ion er could the term parent "be determined solely
by biology or genetics."2 The use of ART, especially in nontraditional
families, was leading courts away from biological and gestational models
towards "a more functional view of parenthood." 2 8
As early as 1992, a Pennsylvania appellate tribunal in Blew v. Verta 29
admonished courts for failing to validate "unusual or complex" family
arrangements and for perpetuating "the fiction of family homogeneity at
the expense of children whose reality does not fit this form."30 The court
was addressing a mother's right to visit her son in the company of her
lesbian partner,3 ' but the call for tolerance could easily apply to any
nontraditional family, including those formed by surrogacy and ART.
Particularly in states where surrogacy contracts are invalid,32 courts
continue to fall back on genetic or biological connections when parentage
and custody disputes arise. In Michigan, where surrogacy contracts are
illegal, a gestational mother unilaterally declared herself the better parent
But for the couple's
for twins she had borne for an infertile couple.
financial provision for eggs, sperm, and gestational services, the twins
would not have existed. Yet, based on tenuous allegations of the intended
mother's mental unfitness, the court awarded custody to the surrogate-the
only one of the parties who could claim a biological connection to the
twins. 34 "Shotgun marriage may be dead," noted June Carbone and Naomi
Bruce L. Wilder, Assisted Reproduction Technology: Trends and Suggestions for the
DevelopingLaw, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 177, 195 (2002).
27 Dena Moyal & Carolyn Shelley, Future Child's Rights in New Reproductive
Technology: Thinking Outside the Tube and Maintaining the Connections, 48 FAM. CT.
REV. 431, 433 (2010).
28 CHARLES P. KINDREGAN & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
26

93 (2006).
617 A.2d 31 (Pa. 1992).

TECHNOLOGY
29

Id. at 36.
Id. at 31.
32 See M. Celeste Schejbal-Vossmeyer, What Money Cannot Buy: Commercial
Surrogacy and the Doctrine of Illegal Contracts, 32 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 1171 (1988). A
Michigan Court of Appeals has held that the right to privacy protects the decision to bear
and beget a child, but it does not preclude the state from interfering in the contractual
arrangement entailed in surrogacy. Id. at 1175. The Kentucky Supreme Court has similarly
held surrogacy contracts voidable under the state's adoption consent statutes. Id. at 1178.
3 See Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby, with Few Ground Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2009, at 1.
3o

31

34 id.
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Cahn,3 but when the functional clashes with the biological, "shotgun
parenthood is not." 36 The "widely disparate" nature of state laws on
surrogacy and ART obstructs uniformity and makes consistency unlikely
in determining matters of parentage.
With Baby M as a point of reference, this article explores the cultural,
legislative, and judicial responses to new reproductive technologies.
Despite earlier fears, empirical evidence disputes the notion that surrogacy
and ART make childbearing slaves of women and commodities of
children. Though not without problems for the families they create, these
reproductive practices are here to stay, and courts and lawmakers must
come to terms with them. Part II describes late twentieth century
reproductive patterns and the emergence of ART. Infertility, delayed
childbearing, nontraditional family arrangements, and a shortage of
adoptable white babies all contributed to the rise of ART. Part III explores
some of the fallacies surrounding surrogacy and presents research
involving the children of ART. Surrogates, in general, are the victims of
neither coercion nor exploitation. The children of ART, however, require
greater attention and sensitivity to their need to know more about their
parentage. Part IV considers the evolving legal standards for determining
parenthood in the twenty-first century. In light of dramatic social changes
in family composition and the rapid proliferation of reproductive
technologies, judges and lawmakers should no longer rely on outmoded
presumptions when crafting the legal norms for parentage and custody
determinations. Part V argues that preconception intent plus consistent
behavior should be central to whatever statutory and case law approaches
ultimately emerge for resolving parenthood disputes.
II. SHOPPING FOR PARENTHOOD
In Baby M, amidst a meditation on the irrelevance of voluntariness in
paid surrogacy arrangements and the price of "labor, love, or life,"3 Justice
Wilentz opined for the court, "There are, in a civilized society, some things
that money cannot buy." 3 9 Justice Wilentz was misinformed. Even before
the advent of the ART boom, it was apparent that "the wall between
commerce and adoption is not completely impenetrable," that adoption
3 June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child
Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1011, 1025
(2003).
36 id
37 Katherine Drabiak et al., Ethics, Law and Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for
Unformity, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 300, 301 (2007).
3 In re Baby M., 527 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1987).
3 Id.
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fees "vary dramatically," and that some adults are willing to expend "huge
sums" on adopting a child.40 The cost of domestic private adoption ranges
from $4,000 to $30,000, as compared to $7,000 to $30,000 for
Children who are racial minorities are
international adoptions.4 1
sometimes less expensive to adopt than white children, indicating that
adoption costs for various children, "like price in other markets, is one
factor influencing people to adopt one baby rather than another."4 2 With
reproductive technologies, it is not the children that are on display but
instead, the means to produce them. In ART, "egg and sperm are sold, and
the rights to their contents and reproductive energy legally transferred."A3
Whether it is through adoption, surrogacy, egg donor, alternative
insemination, or in vitro fertilization (IVF), the exchange of money for
parental status has become routine." There is, in short, a "functioning
market" in parenthood.45
In the United States, this seemingly unquenchable thirst for offspring
began in the mid-twentieth century with the rise of the nuclear family as
the ideal of "domestic perfection.""6 Infertile couples in the post World
War II years turned to adoption to erase "the stigma of childlessness in an
era of 'compulsory parenthood.""A7 The use of artificial insemination
began to take hold in the 1930s, becoming more prevalent after World War
The first successful IVF took place in 1978, followed by the
11.48
emergence of surrogate motherhood practices in the 1980s.49
The treatment of infertility accelerated as the supply of adoptable
children, especially healthy white infants, diminished.50 By 1988, only 3%
40 Susan Frelich Appleton, Adoption in the Age of Reproductive Technology, 2004 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 393, 425 (2004).
41 Martha M. Ertman, What's Wrong with a ParenthoodMarket? A New and Improved

Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 10 (2003).
42

id

43 LIZA MUNDY, EVERYTHING

CONCEIVABLE: How ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IS

CHANGING MEN, WOMEN, AND THE WORLD 101 (2007).
4

Ertman, supra note 41, at 7, 11.

45 Id. at 7.
46 J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stem, The Winding Road from Form to Function: A

BrieffHistory of ContemporaryMarriage,21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 1, 3 (2008).
47 Appleton, supra note 40, at 403 (citing ELAINE TYLER MAY, BARREN IN THE
PROMISED LAND 127 (1997)).
48 Id. at 405-06.
49

Id. at 406.

'o ld. at 405.
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of babies born to single white women were relinquished for adoption,
compared to 19% before 1973.s' Many people have been barred from
adopting because of their sexual orientation, age, or marital status, and in
the United States, mothers who give up their children "often hand-pick the
adoptive parents."52 For infertile couples, ART became an alluring
alternative to adoption.53 Aside from the shortage of available white
babies, the adoption process could be costly, risky, and subject to
disruption by the birth parents.54 By the end of the twentieth century, the
combined annual birth rate from donor insemination, IVF, and surrogacy
arrangements was 76,000 while only 30,000 healthy children were
available for adoption."
Childrearing began to change in the last century from "a community
endeavor ... designed to produce good citizens for the future" to a "route
to personal satisfaction and private happiness for adults."56 As infertility
became increasingly "medicalized," ART marketers instilled in the
infertile a sense that they were personally responsible for their undesired
childlessness, fueling "the drive to pursue treatment after treatment."57
Today, the patient base for ART is comprised, "first and foremost," of men
with fertility problems followed by women who suffer from conditions like
endometriosis, fibroids, missing uteruses, ovulation difficulties, or
advanced maternal age.58 Doctors at fertility clinics treat "plumbers,
schoolteachers and lawyers" as well as patients whose desire for children
has been hampered by psychological problems, life-threatening diseases, or
crippling accidents.59 Among the fastest growing clientele are single
mothers, lesbians, and gays--driven less by infertility than by the absence
of a willing or viable reproductive partner.60 In lesbian couples, the nonchildbearing partner often risks losing access to a child she planned for,
cared for, and supported when the relationship dissolves. 6 1 A technique
s1 MUNDY, supra note 43, at 46.
Saul, supra note 33, at 45.

52

5 See MUNDY, supra note 43, at 47.
54
Appleton, supra note 40, at 428.
SId. at 429.
soId. at 401.
7
Id. at 432.
58 MUNDY, supra note 43, at 10.
9

Id. at 11.

60 Id.

61 See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who Is a Parent?:The Need to Develop a Lesbian Conscious

Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTs. 513, 516-17 (1993).
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known as ROPA (Reception of Oocytes from PArtners) allows both
women in a lesbian couple to share in the pregnancy.62 Eggs retrieved
from one partner can be fertilized and implanted for gestation in the
other. Or if both women are fertile, they can exchange embryos with
each woman gestating her partner's fertilized eggs.
The new reproductive technologies are part of "modernity's impulse to
control the body and extend choice,"6 and they are spurring the
ART has reconfigured
proliferation of nontraditional families. 6
parenthood by compartmentalizing it.6 7 At the same time, for countless
couples and individuals, it has made parenthood "deliciously possible."6 8
In 2007, the rate of births to unmarried women reached a record 39.7%
of all U.S. births.69 A good many of these women, perhaps "tens of
thousands," are single mothers by choice.70 Some of them have grown
impatient in their search for reproductively willing partners, having
endured "too many years of uncertainty from too many noncommittal
males."7 1 Liza Mundy half jokingly mused, "Reluctant single men. Where
are the cover stories agonizing about the threat they pose to the traditional
American family?" 72
But, as single-mother-by-choice Lori Gottlieb noted, ambivalence lies
on both sides of the gender equation.7 ' A lot of Gen X women "took it for
granted that we could do anything we wanted" and ended up paralyzed by
indecision. 74 Unwilling to compromise on their choice of mate, they forgot
S. Marina et al., Sharing Motherhood: Biological Lesbian Co-Mothers, a New IVF
Indication, 25 HUM. REPROD. 938, 939 (2010), available at http://humrep.oxfordjournals.
org/content/25/4/938.full.pdf.
63 Id.
62

" Id. at 940.
65 Hal B. Levine, Gestational Surrogacy; Nature and Culture in Kinship, 42
ETHNOLOGY 173, 175 (2003).
6 Appleton, supra note 40, at 443.
MUNDY, supra note 43, at 13.
68 id.
69 Brady E. Hamilton et al., Births: PreliminaryDatafor 2007, NAT'L VITAL STAT.
REP., Mar. 18, 2009, at 3, 13 tbl. 7, availableat http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/
nvsr57 12.pdf.
70 MUNDY, supranote 43, at 157.
71 id.
72 Id
SLori Gottlieb, The XY Files, ATLANTIc MONTHLY, Sep. 2005, at 149-50, availableat
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/09/the-xy-files/4172/.
74 Id at 144.
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"that if you don't choose anything, eventually you're left with nothing.""s
In the new millennium, women in their thirties see themselves confronting
a choice "between love and offspring."76 As Gottlieb perused the sperm
donor profiles, she found it "liberating to have the pick of the genetic
crop."7 Instead of "marrying a schlubby but lovable man" with less than
stellar physical attributes, she could "indulge hubristic fantasies of genetic
engineering."" Ironically, after becoming pregnant, Gottlieb attracted the
attention of a surprising number of men in their thirties.7 9 She believed
they were charmed by her lack of ulterior motive and by the chance to be
liked for their innate qualities rather than their procreative potential.so
"The men I'm dating realize that I already have everything else I want,"
explained Gottlieb, "so now I'm in this purely for a chance at love."
Sex has become increasingly divorced from marriage and
reproduction, to the extent that the labels marriage and family no longer
predictably reveal their inner workings. 82 ART has burrowed deep into our
social institutions and extended its reach around the globe. At an estimated
rate of 250,000 per year," more than 3 million ART babies have been born
worldwide, making up 4% of all live births." The largest sperm bank in
the world is in Denmark, and it exports three-quarters of its product
overseas.85 Patients from Spain, France, Australia, and elsewhere travel to
California clinics, eager to take advantage of ART regulations more liberal
than in their own countries.86 Couples-straight and gay-from Canada,
the United States, Israel, Europe, and other countries "can combine eggs
75
76

id.

Id. at 141.
"Id. at 143.
78 id.
79

Id. at 150.

80 id
81 Id.

Levine, supra note 65, at 183.
s3 Katie Cottingham, Fact or Fiction: Artificial Reproductive Technologies Make Sick
Kids, SCI. AM. (Jul. 1, 2010), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=artificialreproductive-tech-kids.
8 Chitose Suzuki, Researchers:Most 'Test Tube' Kids Are Healthy, USA TODAY (Feb.
22, 2010), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2010-02-22-test-tube-babies_ N.htm?cspusat.me.
85 ELIZABETH MARQUARDT ET AL., My DADDY'S NAME Is DONOR 5 (2010), available at
http://www.familyscholars.orglassets/DonorFINAL.pdf.
" Id. at 15.
82
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and sperm (their own or someone else's) and have the resulting embryo
carried by a village woman in India for a fraction of the cost" in America.
Fertility tourism has produced a "pulsing commerce, with dollars and
Euros flying around the world." 88 A growing number of twenty-first
century babies are "global citizens"89 in ways that our ancestors could
never have envisioned or comprehended.
ART has come a long way since Baby M's excoriation of the
childbearing marketplace. Surrogacy has slipped most of its moral
constraints,9 and many of ART's children are now old enough to speak for
themselves. 9 1 Along with aspiring parents and the clinics that serve them,
the donors, surrogates, and children are the major players in ART's
unfolding history.
Their insight and experience are crucial to an
understanding of the ways in which these new technologies have infiltrated
our culture and molded our reproductive future.
III. PARTICIPANTS AND PRODUCTS INTHE REPRODUCTIVE
MARKETPLACE
A. The Surrogates
Reproductive technologies do not alter the desire for parenthood, but
they do create a gulf between marriage and motherhood and the "drives,
emotions, and desires of pregnancy." 9 2 In our contemporary culture, the
yearning to become a parent is sufficient pretext for setting in motion the
mechanisms for achieving pregnancy and parenthood. At times, this can
only be accomplished through collaborative reproduction and by
"borrowing the reproductive capacity of another woman." 94 No longer are
the ties of kinship forged by nature and instinct alone, but also by "choice,
Surrogate motherhood helps to form families when
love, and intention.
desire and intent are impeded by nature.

" Id. at 15-16.
8
Id. at 16.
89 Id.
90 Scott, supra note 2, at 136.
91See MARQUARDT ET AL., supra note 85, at 21-25.
92

Levine, supra note 65, at 183.

93

id.
supra note 43, at 94.
Levine, supra note 65, at 177.

94 MUNDY,
9
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The "moral panic"96 that ensued in Baby M's aftermath produced laws
designed either to prohibit surrogacy or to discourage it by forbidding
payment to the gestational mother.97 Baby M's Justice Wilentz had no
problem with the practice as long as the surrogate mother acted voluntarily,
received no remuneration, and obtained "the right to change her mind and
to assert her parental rights."98 The trial court in A.G.R. engaged in
identical reasoning when it voided a paid surrogacy contract, even though
the gestational mother had carried the eggs of an anonymous donor. 99 In
its haste to condemn the practice of surrogacy, the A.G.R. court seemed
more concerned with the emotional harm to the surrogate mother than with
the long-term needs of the children. Noting that in Baby M.'s time the
legislature was silent on the legality of surrogacy contracts, A.G.R.
concluded that "the additional twenty-one years of silence as to surrogacy
agreements speaks even louder."100 In those intervening years, however,
surrogacy changed dramatically. Today, 95% of surrogates carry embryos
created by genetic materials other than their own. o In fact, most
surrogacy agreements "stipulate that the woman who carries the baby
cannot also donate the egg." 0 2
Cases like Baby M. are rarities today. A.G.R.'s facts are more
problematic, though its principal defect is its rote adherence to Baby M
and its failure to distinguish between the fact that Whitehead was
genetically related to the subject child whereas Robinson was not.103 The
court was well aware of the obligations that parental status imposes.
Scott, supra note 2, at 125.
Id. at 117.
98 In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1264 (N.J. 1988).
9 A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., No. FD-09-1838-07, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec.
23, 2009), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20091231 SUR
ROGATE.pdf.
96
97

at *4.
101Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, Revisiting The Handmaid's Tale: Feminist Theory
100 Id.

Meets Empirical Research on Surrogate Mothers 8 (2009) (unpublished manuscript),
availableat http://claradoc.gpa.free.fr/doc/329.pdf.
102 Lorraine Ali & Raina Kelley, The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7,
2008, at 47.
103 Compare Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1254-55 (dismissing an equal protection claim by a
sperm donor against Whitehead, the surrogate mother who used her own eggs to fertilize
the pregnancy), with A.G.R., No. FD-09-1838-07, at *2 (noting that the surrogate mother
Robinson, A.G.R., carried the fetus created by eggs donated by an unknown woman).
4
'0 A. G.R., No. FD-09-1838-07, at *2.
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Awarding parental rights to a person with no genetic bond and no clearly
stated intention of becoming a parent serves neither personal nor policy
interests. The parties in A.G.R. also suffered because of their unfortunate
choice of a gestational mother. Robinson, the surrogate, appears to have
been psychologically unprepared to give up the twins, or possibly, the
intended parented never plainly specified her role in regards to the
children.'os Additionally, her familial relationship to the children-she is
their paternal aunt-created a continuing obstacle to the Hollingsworths'
unfettered assertion of their intended parental rights.'0 6 As it is practiced
today, surrogacy strives to avoid the perils of both Baby M and A.G.R. 07
When it works, and it most often does, surrogacy strengthens the concept
of family as surely as it transforms it.
Although surrogates admit that separating from the baby "is still the
hardest part of the job,"'08 they rarely refuse to relinquish a child after
giving birth.'09 Given the estimated 1,000 surrogacy agreements entered
into each year in the United States, "the lack of litigation is remarkable.""1 0
In many states, lawmakers are now less concerned with discouraging and
"punishing a pernicious practice"' than with more pragmatic issues such
as clarifying parental status and "protecting all participants, especially
children."ll 2 The evolution of surrogacy's image from a coercive,
commodifying moral threat to a socially accepted practice"' illustrates the
triumph of the empirical over the theoretical.
This is not to suggest that the commodification question has been
definitively resolved, even in the minds of the surrogates themselves.
Katherine Drabiak and her coauthors defined commercial surrogacy as "a
contractual relationship where compensation is paid to a surrogate and
agency, excluding any reasonable medical, legal, or psychological
expenses, in exchange for the surrogate's gestational services."l 4 When a
practice like surrogacy has yet to attain full cultural consensus,
contractualization "insulates socially marginal transactions from the bias in
105 Id.

id
See Scott, supra note 2, at 120-21.
l08 Ali & Kelley, supra note 102, at 49.
1o9 Busby & Vun, supra note 101, at 40.
no Id. at 14.
1" Scott, supra note 2,at 121.
112 id
11 See generally Scott, supra note 2 (discussing changing views of surrogacy).
114 Drabiak et al., supra note 37, at 301.
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107
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majoritarian morality.""'5 For nontraditional seekers ofparenthoodsingle people, lesbians, and gays-contractualization offers privacy and a
"safe haven" in which to pursue one's dreams "relatively free from the
constraints imposed by the lowest common denominator of public
In view of the public's distaste for baby selling,
opinion.""'6
contractualization avoids commodification claims by defining the
gestational services, not the baby, as the "item for sale."ll 7 One surrogate
mother explained, "If you're being paid for your time, it's like a contract
and it severs it completely at the end because it is a job done and you're
paid for it and that's the end of it.""
This statement highlights two of the main perplexities facing
surrogates: the acceptance of money for bearing a child and the act of
relinquishing that child as part of the contractual obligation. To do her job,
a surrogate has to make peace with her conscience on both of these issues.
On the matter of fetal attachment, discussed more fully below, she
succeeds by firmly believing the baby is not hers to keep." 9 On the issue
of compensation, she frames her motive as altruistic rather than financial,
the "desire to help a childless couple" or to "create a family for a person
who otherwise would have no way" of doing so.1 20 The payment,
generally a modest sum of $20,000 to $25,000,121 only serves to facilitate
the pre-existing altruistic plan. 12 2
Research shows that although surrogates are not poor, they are usually
of lower income and are less educated than the intended parents that
employ them.123 Most agencies decline to accept women on public
assistance, and there is no empirical evidence that women are driven to
surrogacy by financial crisis.124 The vast majority of surrogates have

Ertman, supranote 41, at 24.
115
116 id.

117 Janet L. Dolgin, Status and Contract in SurrogateMotherhood: An Illumination of

the Surrogacy Debate, 38 BUFF. L. REv. 515, 549 (1990).
I1s Busby & Vun, supra note 101, at 27 (quoting Hazel Basilington, The Social
Organization of Surrogacy: Relinquishing a Baby and the Role of Payment in the
PsychologicalDetachment Process,7 J. HEALTH PSYCHOL. 57, 61 (2002)).
119 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 65, at 179.
120 Busby & Vun, supra note 101,
at 28.
121Ali & Kelley, supra note 102,
at 45.
122 See Levine, supra note 65,
at 181.
123 Busby & Vun, supra note 101, at
18-20.
124 Id. at
19.
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already had two or three children and completed their families.125 Payment
for gestational services allows these women to work part-time or to remain
at home to raise young children.12 6 With the money earned, surrogates can
supplement their family's income. They can also afford to indulge in a
family trip to Disney World, or as in the case of one gestational mother, to
build an occupational therapy gym for her autistic son.127 In states like
Texas and California, surrogacy agencies actively recruit military wives by
distributing leaflets at military housing complexes and advertising in
military publications.12 8 With a single pregnancy, a military spouse can
earn more than her husband's annual base pay, which ranges from $16,080
to $28,900 for new enlistees.1 2 9 And the fact that the gestational process
takes less than a year "gives them enough time between postings" to work
as surrogates.130
In terms of their personality profiles, surrogates tend to be "sociable,
assertive, active, energetic and optimistic."' 3 ' They are also likely to be
"self-sufficient, independent thinkers and nonconformists" who are less
troubled by social taboos than other women. 132 Rather than feeling
demeaned or exploited, surrogates find the experience empowering-one
that enhances self-esteem and instills "a sense of uniqueness and
accomplishment."l 3 3 They take pleasure in being pregnant, are skilled and
knowledgeable about it, and often regard surrogacy as a "vocation or

calling."

34

Altruism is self-gratifying, but surrogates also want to be thanked and
appreciated, and to have their altruism "celebrated and acknowledged." 3 5
A personal relationship with the intended parents, "even though limited to
a few visits or some telephone contact," brings greater satisfaction to the
125

Id. at 22; see generally Ali & Kelley, supra note 102 (describing the lives of

surrogates).
126 Busby & Vun, supra note 101,
at 26.

Ali & Kelley, supranote 102, at 48.
128 id.
127

129 id

Id. (quoting "Melissa Brisman, of New Jersey, a lawyer who specializes in
reproductive and family issues, and heads the largest surrogacy firm on the East Coast").
13' Busby & Vun, supra note 101, at 21.
132 id
33
1 Id. at 28.
134 Id. (citing HELENA RAGONE, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION AT THE HEART
55 (1994)).
130

13s MUNDY, supra note 43, at 136.
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surrogacy experience.136 "I really wanted to feel as though the people I
was doing this with were my friends," said one gestational mother, "that's
how I wouldn't feel used." 3 7 When treated with "respect, honor and
care,"' 38 surrogates find that it is their bond with the intended parents, not
with the baby, that is of the utmost value. 39
One of Baby M's prime objections to contractual surrogacy was that
"the natural mother is irrevocably committed before she knows the strength
of her bond with her child."l 4 0 Here, the operative term is "natural
mother": a woman who carries her own egg. In a natural pregnancy, in
utero bonding maximizes survival because "the fetus carries the genes of
the woman who gestates it.""'4 In the age of reproductive technology, the
dictates of evolution are yielding to functionalism.14 2 Today's surrogates,
who rarely carry their own egg, do not regard the fetus as their own, and it
is clear that "bonding does not constitute an impediment to surrogate
motherhood." 4 3 If fetal attachment were such a "fundamental biological
reality," the practice of surrogacy would be "unsustainable."'" And if
bonding is not consequential in surrogate pregnancies, then other
mechanisms must be at work to "counteract the surrogate's impulse to
identify the child as her own."1 45 In her research, Heldna Ragon6
136 Busby & Vun, supra note 101, at 31.

13 MUNDY, supra note 43, at 136.
138 Busby & Vun, supra note 101, at 32.
139 Id. at 39. In her interviews with surrogates, Mundy found that many women
preferred to work with gay male couples. MUNDY, supra note 43, at 130-31. As one
surrogate explained, "Infertile couples-surrogacy is their last choice. To them, every
single part of this is just another hurdle to overcome. With a gay couple, it's their first
choice. It's the way they get to have biological children, and they're thrilled." Id. at 135
(quoting Ann Nelson, a twenty-nine-year-old surrogate). Infertile couples undergoing IVF
treatment may be subject to depression and anxiety as well as lowered self-esteem, poor
marital communication, sexual dysfunction, and social isolation. Chun-Shin Hahn, Review:
Psychosocial Well-Being of Parentsand Their Children Born After Assisted Reproduction,
26 J. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 525, 526 (2001).
140 In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J.
1988).
141Levine, supra note 65, at 176.
142id.
43

Id. at 177-78.
'"Id at 177.
145 Id. at 178. A 2000 study of gestational surrogacy found that nearly a third of
surrogates and intended parents do not share the same cultural, ethnic, and racial
backgrounds. Busby & Vun, supra note 101, at 20. Some participants prefer to be matched
with people of another race and ethnicity "because they believe that it would be less likely
(continued)
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discovered these mechanisms in the surrogates' main motivations: "They
wanted to help infertile couples, they wanted to earn money at home, and
they loved being pregnant." 46 Bonding is not obstructive to surrogate
motherhood because it is the circumstances preceding, rather than
following, impregnation that provide the inducement.147
"[T]he
opportunity to have a pregnancy and birth without the responsibility of
having a child to bring up after it" attracted one gestational mother.148
Another felt more "like a caring babysitter"' 49 than a mother, while still
another "almost felt guilty for not feeling bad about giving up the baby." 50
In the course of his research, Hal Levine monitored a listserv for
surrogate mothers."5 ' This network of support, encouragement, and shared
experience helped surrogates overcome in utero bonding. 152 One surrogate
asked, "Do you think it will sound crazy if I say I want to be able to keep
the baby in my room for a little while after the parents have decided to
leave the hospital and go home for the night?"' 53 A member of the list
responded, "They are the parents. I hate to sound like I'm minimizing our
job, but we are just there to carry babies. When the baby has its first cry
our job is over."' 5 4 In addition to supplying a ready conduit for advice and
empathy, this organization of surrogate mothers helps surrogates, their
families, and the intended parents accomplish a sense of closure at the end
of the process.155
A drive for legitimacy and professionalism motivates all of surrogacy's
participants, including the surrogates' husbands, agency staff, and intended
parents, as well as the surrogates themselves.' 6 Psychological screening
of potential surrogates is imperative, described by one applicant as one of
that the surrogate mother will feel a strong connection to a child who is different from her."
Id. at 20-21.
146 Levine, supra note 65, at 178 (citing Helena Ragon6, Chasing
the Blood-Tie:
Surrogate Mothers, Adoptive Mothers and Fathers, 23 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 352, 352-65
(1996)).
147id.
48

1

Busby & Vun, supra note 101, at 29.
Ali & Kelley, supra note 102, at 49.

150

Busby & Vun, supra note 101, at 38.

149

11 Levine, supra note 65, at 178.
See id. at 180.
Id.
54
1 Id. at 179-80.
.s.
See id. at 179.
1s6 Id. at 180.
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the most "grueling" and "invasive" aspects of the process. 157 One
surrogacy agency president asserted that parents who seek out reputable
agencies that carefully select their surrogates have a "99 percent chance of
getting a baby and a 100 percent chance of keeping it."' 5
Baby M discerned no legal prohibition against unpaid surrogacy.159
But while the absence of payment might have soothed the moral qualms of
Justice Wilentz, it does little for a gestational mother who spends a
minimum of nine months on the job and is "on task twenty-four hours a
day altering her nutrition and other behaviors, risking physical injury,
undergoing profound emotional and hormonal changes, and also enduring
extraordinary physical pain and hardship while giving birth." 6 o It is not
unusual for surrogates to construe their services as "a type of giftgiving"'61 (albeit with modest compensation), and some have likened it to
organ donation.162
Janet Dolgin observed that "gifts bind," while
6
3
"contracts separate.,
Gifts "transform relationships," while "contracts
leave them untouched, and while gifts bespeak attachment, contracts
bespeak freedom."'"
She further suggested that because surrogacy
agreements are a hybrid of gift and contract, legal approaches must address
each of these elements.' 65 Katherine Drabiak and her coauthors suspected
that surrogates "feel socially pressured to provide a socially acceptable
justification for their activity." 66 Thus, notions of altruism and gift-giving
serve to obscure "economic self-interest."' 6 But if children are "priceless
gifts" 6 8 and putting a price on them is distasteful, surrogates may tend to
subordinate their own financial interests.
This places them at a
disadvantage when negotiating contract terms.

157 Ali
158

& Kelley, supra note 102, at 49.
Id. (quoting John Weltman, the president of Circle Surrogacy in Boston).
15' In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988) ("We find no offense to our present
laws where a woman voluntarily and without payment agrees to act as a 'surrogate' mother,
provided that she is not subject to a binding agreement to surrender her child.").
160 Ertman, supra note
41, at 12.
161 Levine, supra note 65,
at 181.
162 See id.; Ali & Kelley, supra note 102, at 48.
163 Dolgin, supra note 117,
at 524.
164 d

167
168

Drabiak et al., supra note 37, at 305.
Ertman, supra note 41, at 17.
Drabiak et al., supra note 37, at 305.
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Katherine Drabiak and her coauthors proposed a regulatory scheme
determining reasonable compensation to surrogates.169 Along with
disparity in state surrogacy laws, there is also no uniform regulation of the
practice.17 0 The use of the internet has made surrogacy "a distinct
interstate business,"' 7 ' and the absence of uniform industry standards
exposes both surrogates and parents to exploitation by surrogacy
agencies. 172 Further, surrogates lack standing to bring contract claims in
states that penalize, prohibit, or simply ignore the practice.17 3
Surrogacy succeeds when the parties clearly understand what is
expected of them. The Canadian Bar Association recommended that all
surrogates obtain legal advice before entering into contracts and that fees
for such legal advice be considered a compensable expense.174 Legal
advice is not, however, "a substitute for screening or separate and joint
counseling" of surrogate applicants and parents.17 1
Surrogacy has achieved legitimacy unanticipated in Baby M's time.
The practice continues to be vulnerable to charges of commodification and
baby selling, and there is lingering aversion to commerce in women's
bodies as childbearing vessels.' 7 6 But the surrogates' deeply felt motives
and convictions seem to make these accusations sound, at the very least, ill
informed. As to whether contractualization demeans parenthood, one
might answer: "It is hard to follow the argument that pre-conception
agreements reduce parenthood to a transaction. That 'transaction' is but
the first step to becoming a parent, with most of the work of 'family and
parental responsibilities' yet to come."l77
B. The Donors
From 1998 to 2007, the number of ART cycles performed in the
United States nearly doubled, producing 57,569 infants in 2007.178 The

169 Id. at 307.
170

Id. at 306.

171

id.

2

Id. at 307.
73
1 Id. at 302.
174 Busby & Vun, supra note 101, at 52.
175 Id.
176 See Scott, supra note 2, at 109.
177 Busby & Vun, supra note 101, at 45.
MART Report Section 5-ART Trends 1998-2007, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
PREVENTION (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2007/section5.htm.
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"exploding market"' 79 in human eggs is fueled by demands for stem cell
researchso as well as infertility in women who wait until advanced age to
begin bearing children.' 8 ' It is estimated that 100,000 young women have
been recruited to sell their eggs to the nearly 500 IVF clinics in the United
States.182 Fees typically range from $8,000 to $15,000 but can run as high
as $100,000.'
The egg donor industry, largely unregulated, is a lucrative
business for physicians, fertility clinics, and the university OB/GYN
departments connected with them.184
Unlike surrogates, who are esteemed for their gestational abilities as
well as for their social and communications skills, egg donors market their
brains, physical assets, ethnic backgrounds, educational levels,
psychological stability, and health histories.' 85 Although egg donation
sports a veneer of altruism, most young women involved in it are
"savvy"' 86 and financially motivated. Like sperm donors, they want to
help people, but they also share a desire to play a role in the gene pool.
In the words of one egg donor, "Men have always been able to spread their
genes. Now I can spread my genes."'8 But unlike sperm donation, which
carries little or no physical risk,'89 the effects of hormonally stimulated egg
production are mostly unknown, especially in the long term. An egg donor
survey conducted by Wendy Kramer and her coauthors found more than
30% of respondents experienced ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome
"7 Josephine Marcotty & Chen May Yee, Miracles for Sale, MINNEAPOLIS STAR
TRIBUNE, Oct. 21, 2007, at Al.
180

Jennifer Schneider, It's Time for an Egg Donor Registry and Long-Term Follow-Up:

Testimony at Congressional Briefing, CTR. FOR GENETICS & Soc'Y (Nov. 14, 2007),

http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=3820.
181Alison Motluk, The Human Egg Trade: How Canada's Fertility Laws Are Failing
Donors, Doctors, and Parents, THE WALRUS (Apr. 2010), http://www.walrusmagazine.
com/print/2010.04-health-the-human-egg-trade/. The mean age of a mother at first birth
increased nearly four years from 1970 to 2003. See Martin et al., supranote 24, at 2.
182 W. Kramer et al., U.S. Docyte Donors: A Retrospective Study of Medical and
PsychosocialIssues, 24 HUM. REPROD. 3144, 3144 (2009).
183Id.
184 Schneider, supra note
180.
185 See MUNDY, supra note 43, at 133.
186 Schneider, supra note
180.
187 Michael Leahy, Family Vacation, WASH. POST (Jun. 19,
2005), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/I5/AR2005061 501885.html.
188 Marcotty & Yee, supra note 179, at Al 8 (quoting Caitlin Karolczak,
"an artist and
antique dealer in Minneapolis" who has "been an egg donor twice").
189 Schneider, supra note
180.
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(OHSS), with 11.6% of them requiring medical treatment, hospitalization,
or both.' 90 More than a quarter (26.4%) reported new infertility problems,
changes in their menstrual cycle, or both.' 9' The risks associated with
hormonal ovarian stimulation appear to increase "with the number of
cycles undergone." 92 The study's authors concluded, "There is clearly a
need for an oocyte donor registry" to track the effects of egg retrieval on
donors and to monitor the continuing state of their health. 93
For the most part, egg and sperm donors are anonymous. 19 4 While the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention collects data on pregnancy
outcomes, multiple births, and technologies used, it does not require
fertility agencies to track the health of individual donors.'95 Wendy
Kramer and her coauthors found only 2.6% of egg donor survey
respondents reported that their IVF clinics contacted them for medical
updates.196 More than a third of respondents experienced medical changes
of potential concern to donor children.' 97 Roughly half of these women did
not attempt to contact their fertility clinic to update them due to "lack of
education about the value of providing such information, along with the
lack of encouragement by the fertility clinic to do so."'
Of those who
attempted to contact their clinics with medical updates, several
encountered "a missing or destroyed chart; a clinic that had closed or
relocated and could not be found; and a clinic that declined to notify
oocyte recipients on the basis of anonymity."' 99 The fertility industry's
lack of diligence in tracking donor health starts at the beginning of the
process with a tendency to understate the risks of oocyte donation.
Because of the IVF clinics' close financial bond with ooctye recipients, a
190 Kramer et al., supra note 182, at 3146.
Severe OHSS results in severe pain or
swelling of the abdomen, decreased urination, and shortness of breath, necessitating
hospitalization to drain excess fluids from the body. Ovarian HyperstimulationSyndrome,
MEDLINE PLUS (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/00729
4.htm.
191 Kramer et al., supra note 182, at 3146.
'92 Id. at 3148.

193
194

id.

William Heisel, Registry May Track Egg, Sperm Donors, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
3, 2008,

at B.
195 Id.
196 Kramer et al., supra note 182, at 3147.
197 id.
'9 Id. at 3148.
'" Id. at 3147.

2011]1

THE CHIDREN OF BABY M.

365

potential conflict of interest prevents them from fully disclosing to donors
the medical risks of egg retrieval procedures. 20 0 Even when clinics fully
discuss known risks and inform donors that long-term risks are unknown,
donors "may not clearly understand the difference between 'there are no
known risks' and 'there are no risks."' 2 0 '
The long-term health of sperm and egg donors is of profound interest
to their donor offspring, particularly in regard to genetically related
medical conditions.20 2
But, while Great Britain, Sweden, Austria,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, and parts of Australia maintain centralized
donor registries, 203 the United States does not. 2 04 In the American fertility
industry, which seems to prize donor anonymity above all else, experts fear
that a mandatory registry would "scare away" potential donors.2 05 It would
undoubtedly scare away some, perhaps even half,20 6 but the United States
is slowly beginning to embrace disclosure of some aspects of donor
identity. In 2009, the Ethics Committee of the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) strongly encouraged fertility programs to
maintain accurate records of donor health to enable information to be
shared with donor offspring.207 In addition to promoting the informed
consent of donors, the Committee advised programs to gather medical
updates from donors that are pertinent to the health of their offspring. 208 it
also counseled programs to "give consideration to the fact that donors may
have interests in learning the outcome of their donation, especially when
information sharing or contact between donor and offspring are possible in
the future." 20 9

The question of whether donors and their offspring should share
information, and possibly establish contact, is frequently debated in the
literature on ART. Jennifer Schneider and Wendy Kramer noted that as
200

Id. at 3145.

201

Id.
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Id. at 3148.

MUNDY, supra note 43, at 181.
See Heisel, supra note 194, at Bl, B9.
205
Id. at B9.
206 MUNDY, supra note 43, at 191.
207 Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Interests, Obligations,
andRights
of the Donor in Gamete Donation, 91 FERTILITY & STERILITY 22, 22-23 (2009), available
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRMContent/News-andPublications/Ethics
at
ReportsandStatements/interests obligations rights of donor.pdf.
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Id. at 22, 24-25.
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donors age, they begin to wonder about the outcome of the pregnancies to
which they contributed. 210 Donors initially place great value on their
anonymity, but they often later wish to know more about their genetic
offspring.2 11 Informing donors at the outset that this opportunity might be
available to them underscores the long-term impact of their decision to
donate.212 It gives them a glimpse into the future and transforms an
altruistic or economic abstraction into a living, breathing being.
For the first generation of ART's children since Baby M, the veil of
donor anonymity seems to be lifting, illuminating linkages to their genetic
parents, the parents who raised them, and the half siblings they might one
day meet-the strange new conglomeration we are coming to know as
"family."
C. The Children
Although the court in Baby M ultimately awarded custody to the
Sterns, it clearly recognized the magnitude of what Whitehead was
expected to relinquish under the surrogacy agreement. Justice Wilentz
termed it "beyond normal human capabilities" to suppose that Whitehead
would give up her newborn child "without a struggle."213 After all, the
Justice asked, "Other than survival, what stronger force is there?" 2 14
The human gift for adaptation keeps us, for the moment at least, onestep ahead of extinction. Neither survival nor mother-child bonding is rule
bound, and creatures of all species, including our own, will look for
nurturing in any parent figure that seems willing and able to provide it.2 15
The acts of "recognizing and bonding with a parent are more dependent on
,,21 6
exposure and learning than on a genetically programmed response.
Absent "such a promiscuous capacity for trust," an infant who is
abandoned or orphaned shortly after birth "would face certain doom if it
Jennifer Schneider & Wendy Kramer, Egg Donors Need Long-Term Follow-Up:
Recommendations from a Retrospective Study of Oocyte Donors in the US, IVF.NET (Jan.
19, 2009), http://www.ivf.net/ivf/eggdonorsneed longtermfollowup recommenda
tions from-a retrospective study of oocyte donors in theus-o3950.html.
210

211 Id.
212

Id.

In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1259 (N.J. 1988).
id
Rachel Dvoskin, Newborns Can Bond to a "Mother" from a Diferent Species, Sci.
AM. (Nov. 15, 2007), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfn?id=strange-but-truenewborns-can-bond-to-mother-from-different-species.
216 id
213
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were unable to swap preferences for an adoptive parent.'217 Experience
with surrogacy, adoption, and ART reminds us that what is most "natural"
about parent-child bonding is its capacity to flourish in "unnatural"
situations.
Research by Susan Golombok and her colleagues revealed that solid
maternal bonding is less dependent on genetic or gestational relationships
than on "a strong desire for parenthood." 2 18 When compared to parents of
naturally conceived children, surrogacy parents exhibit greater warmth and
emotional involvement with their children as well as lower stress levels.2 19
The presence or absence of prenatal bonding is not determinative, and
pregnancy "is not a prerequisite" for "positive maternal representations of
the mother-child relationship." 2 20 Surrogacy parents have "gone to great
lengths to have a child," which results in higher motivation and
commitment to parenthood. 2 2 1 Greater levels of warmth and emotional
involvement were also seen in parents of children conceived by lVF and
donor insemination (DI).222 As is true in surrogacy and egg donor
families, 22 3 IVF and DI parents are "generally older than first-time parents
of a naturally conceived child." 22 4 Possibly due to an absence of siblings,
IVF, surrogacy, and DI children experience greater commitment and
emotional involvement from their parents.225
Despite these enhanced levels of warmth, emotional involvement, and
parental interaction, Susan Golombok and her colleagues concluded that
ART children "did not differ from the naturally conceived children with
respect to socio-emotional or cognitive development." 2 26 Further, these
positive parental factors do not necessarily "result in even greater well-

217 id
218 Susan

Golombok et al., Surrogacy Families: ParentalFunctioning, Parent-Child

Relationships and Children'sPsychologicalDevelopment at Age 2, 47 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. &
PSYCHIATRY 213, 220 (2006) [hereinafter Golombok et al., SurrogacyFamilies].
219
Id. at 219.
220 Id. at 220.
221
Id. at 219.
222 Susan Golombok et al., Families Created by the New Reproductive Technologies:
Quality of Parenting and Social and Emotional Development of the Children, 66 CHILD
DEV. 285, 293 (1995) [hereinafter Golombok et al., FamiliesCreated].
223 Golombok et al., Surrogacy Families,supra note 218, at 214.
224 Golombok et al., Families Created,supra note 222, at 296.
225 id.
22 Golombok et al., Surrogacy Families, supra note 218, at 220.
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,227

being for the child."
Lutz Goldbeck and his colleagues, however,
suggested that the higher socio-economic status and educational levels of
many ART parents contribute to a more stimulating developmental
environment in which to raise children.228
Children conceived by Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection (ICSI) appear
to have "an elevated risk of borderline delayed cognitive development
compared with singeltons conceived by IVF."229 In ICSI, a single sperm is
injected directly into an unfertilized egg, and unlike in IVF, bypasses the
natural selection process during conception.230 Possibly, this process
results in genetically based cognitive problems. 231 After adjusting for the
educational and socio-economic advantages of ART parents, researchers
found no significant statistical differences in cognitive development
between naturally conceived and ART children. 232 A comparison study of
IVF and naturally conceived children at ages nine to ten showed no
significant difference in IQ or cognitive performance but did show
somewhat higher levels of depression, anxiety, and aggression in IVF
children.2 33 Except for recent research discussed below, no other studies
have reported poorer socio-emotional adjustment in children conceived by
IVF.234
Children conceived by ART are at higher risk for pre-term birth and
low birth weight. 235 Because earlier ART procedures often resulted in
multiple births, it was thought that limiting the number of embryos
implanted after fertilization would reduce the risk to the fetus.236
Surprisingly, however, even singleton ART infants are disproportionately

Golombok et al., Families Created,supra note 222, at 295.
Lutz Goldbeck et al., Cognitive Development of Singletons Conceived by
Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection or In Vitro Fertilizationat Age 5 and 10 Years, 34 J.
PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 774, 779 (2009).
229 Id. at 778.
2 30
Id at 774.
231 Id at 778.
232 C. Carson et al., Cognitive Development Following ART: Effect of Choice
of
227
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Comparison Group, Confounding and Mediating Factors, 25 HuM. REPROD. 244, 247-48
(2010).
233 Hahn, supranote 139,
at 530.
234 id.
235 Shu-Hsin Lee et al., Child Growthfrom Birth to 18 Months Old
Born After Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 47 INr. J. NURSING STUD. 1159, 1164 (2010).
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born pre-term and at low birth weights. 2 37 Adverse neurological outcomes
such as epilepsy and cerebral palsy may be associated with pre-term birth
and low birth weight,2 38 but no strong association exists between cerebral
palsy and ART. 23 9 Data collected from five European countries showed
more childhood illness up to age five in ART-conceived children than
those naturally conceived. 2 40 Because these findings have not been
sufficiently replicated, they are not definitive. 2 4 1 There is some evidence
of increased risk of birth defects in ART children,242 as well as epigenetic
disorders such as Angelman and Beckwith-Wiedemann syndromes.243
Further study is needed to determine whether health risks to ARTconceived children are caused by parental infertility, the IVF procedures
themselves, or a combination of the two. 244 In addition, because adult237

Raymond D. Lambert, Safety Issues in Assisted Reproductive Technology: Aetiology

ofHealth Problems in Singleton ART Babies, 18 HUM. REPROD. 1987, 1987 (2003).
238 Carrie Williams & Alastair Sutcliffe, Infant Outcomes of Assisted Reproduction,
85
EARLY HUM. DEV. 673,

675-76 (2009).

239 Susan M. Reid et al., Cerebral Palsy and Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A

Case-ControlStudy, 52 DEv. MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 161, 165 (2009).
240 M. Bondulelle et al., A Multi-Centre Cohort Study of the Physical Health
of 5 YearOld Children Conceived After Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection, In Vitro Fertilizationand
Natural Conception, 20 HUM. REPROD. 413, 417-18 (2004).
241 Williams & Sutcliffe, supra note 238,
at 675.
242 Michele Hansen et al., Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Risk
of Birth
Defects-A Systematic Review, 20 HUM. REPROD. 328, 336 (2004); J. Reefhuis et al.,
Assisted Reproduction Technology and Major Structural Birth Defects in the United States,
24 HUM. REPROD. 360, 362-63 (2008).
243 Lambert, supra note 237, at 1988. Angelman syndrome may be associated with
epilepsy and poor balance, while Beckwith-Weidemann syndrome is an over-growth
disorder. ANGELMAN SYNDROME GUIDELINE DEv. GROUP, MANAGEMENT OF ANGELMAN
SYNDROME: A CLINICAL GUIDELINE 3 (2009); Lambert, supra note 237, at 1988. Epigenetic
disorders result from genetic anomalies that do not actually alter DNA. John Cloud, Why
Genes Aren't Destiny, TIME, Jan. 18, 2010, at 50, available at http://www.time.
com/time/health/article/0,8599,1951968,00.html;
Ethan Watters, DNA Is Not Destiny,
DISCOVER, Nov. 2006, at 34, 36, availableat http://discovermagazine.com/2006/nov/cover.
244 Williams & Sutcliffe, supra note 238, at 675.
One study included a group of
surrogate mothers, not infertile themselves, who were treated by IVF to carry the children
of other couples. Michael Ludwig & Klaus Diedrich, Follow-Up of Children Born After
Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 5 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 317, 318 (2002). The
children born to the surrogates appeared to have no increased risk of low birth weight,
suggesting that it is the infertility and not the IVF procedure that contributes to higher rates
of prematurity. Id.
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onset diseases such as cardio-vascular disease and Type II diabetes may be
linked to babies that are small for their gestational age, long-term tracking
of children conceived by ART is essential.245
Despite medical concerns requiring further research, reports about the
health of ART-conceived children are, overall, "reassuring." 2 46 As for
emotional adjustment, children conceived by donor insemination within
lesbian relationships are doing quite well. A longitudinal study of
adolescents in planned lesbian families revealed significantly high levels of
social and academic functioning and significantly low incidences of
aggressive and rule-breaking behavior.247 The study's authors credit
parental engagement, educational involvement, and effective disciplinary
styles for the successful adjustment of these children.2 48 Data on gay
fatherhood is much scarcer, because the high costs of adoption and
surrogacy make these households less common than those headed by
lesbians.249
In their survey of adults aged eighteen to forty-five who were
conceived by donor insemination, Elizabeth Marquardt and her coauthors
reported decidedly mixed and complex results. 250 A majority of donorconceived adults described a sense of incompleteness, the feeling of having
a "piece missing." 25 1 One respondent explained that rather than looking for
a dad, she had questions about "who I am and why I do what I do."252
Understandably, many of these donor offspring wanted to learn about their
genetic origins but feared hurting or angering the parents who raised
Some worried about unknowingly becoming romantically
them.253
involved with someone related to them, while others felt confused about

Jeremy G. Thompson et al., Epigenetic Risks Related to Assisted Reproductive
Technologies, 17 HuM. REPROD. 2783, 2783 (2002).
246 Bonduelle et al., supra note 240,
at 418.
247 Nanette Garterell & Henry Bos, U.S. National Longitudinal Lesbian Family
Study:
Psychological Adjustment of 17-Year-Old Adolescents, 126 PEDIATRICS 1, 28, 33-34
(2010), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/126/3/617-a.
248 Id. at 6-7.
249 Alice Park, Study: Children ofLesbians May Do Better than Their Peers, TIME (June
7, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1994480,00.html.
250 See MARQUARDT ET AL., supra note 85, at 5-6 (showing a summary of the study's
findings).
251
Id. at 21.
252 id.
253 Id. at 22.
245
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who their real families were. 254 Fifty-nine percent of respondents said their
parents were always open with them about their means of conception,
while sixteen percent said their parents told them either before or after age
twelve. 255 Twenty percent of respondents learned about their conception in
an unplanned or accidental manner.256 Of this latter group, a 'sizeable
portion reported problems with the law as well as substance abuse and
mental health issues. 2 57 Among those who had always known about their
origins, about one in five reported substance abuse issues and problems
with the law. 258
In spite of these adjustment difficulties, Elizabeth Marquardt and her
coauthors discerned a "strikingly libertarian" 25 9 attitude in their study
subjects toward reproductive technologies in general: 61% said they
favored the practice of donor conception, while 75% agreed that "every
person has a right to a child" and that ART is "good for children because
the children are wanted."26 0 Equally "startling" was the finding that 20%
of these adult donor offspring had already donated their own eggs or sperm
or become surrogate mothers. 2 61 The study's authors appear unable to
convincingly reconcile these contradictory findings-donor offspring who
feel troubled about their origins but who at the same time embrace the
technology. 262 Clearly, however, the majority of donor offspring support
the right of DI children to know the truth about their origins.
[A]pproximately two-thirds of grown donor offspring
support the right of offspring to have non-identifying
information about the sperm donor biological father, to
know his identity, to have the opportunity to form some
kind of relationship with him, to know about the existence
and number of half-siblings conceived with the same
donor, to know the identity of half-siblings conceived with
the same donor, and to have the opportunity as children to
254

Id. at 33-35.
Id. at 55-56.
2 56
Id. at 56.
255

257
258

Id. at 58.
id.

259

Id. at 13.

260

id.

261 id.

See id. at 12-13 (showing the findings without explanation of the inconsistencies
between them).
262
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with half-siblings

Research in 1996 on IVF and DI children and their family functioning
showed that none of the parents had told their children about how they
were conceived. 26 4 Seventy-five percent of the parents decided not to tell
their children, thirteen percent were undecided, and twelve percent planned
to tell them. 2 6 5 Although the majority of these parents elected not to
inform their children of their origins, more than half of them told a friend
or family member. 26 6 It is now well-recognized that secrecy and accidental
discovery produce stress, bewilderment, and feelings of betrayal in
children of ART. 26 7 Arguing in favor of disclosure, one donor-conceived
child eloquently stated, "We didn't ask to be born into this situation, with
its limitations and confusion. It's hypocritical . . .to assume that biological
roots won't matter to the 'products' of the cryobanks' service when the
longing for a biological connection is what brings customers to the banks
in the first place."268 In 2004, ASRM's Ethics Committee announced its
support of disclosing to children the facts of their donor conception, the
available characteristics of the donor, and when all parties agree, the
donor's identity.269 Secrecy and anonymity are slowly giving way to more
open, expansive concepts of family connection.
Parents who disclose the facts of donor conception to their children
have to overcome a number of concerns. They worry that they will
damage their child's trust or emotional development or that their child will
reject them. 27 0 They fear their child will be stigmatized or compare herself
unfavorably to other children and families.271 Parents often struggle to find
comfortable, expressive language with which to explain the use of a donor.
Two basic strategies appear to predominate: "seed-planting" and "right
263

Id. at 11-12.

264

Susan Golombok et al., The European Study of Assisted Reproduction Families:

Family Functioningand Child Development, 11 HuM.
265 Id. at 2329.
266 Id
267
Moyal & Shelley, supra note 27, at 435.
26
8

REPROD.

2324, 2324, 2329 (1996).

Id. at 437.

Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Informing Offspring of Their
Conception by Gamete Donation, 81 FERTILITY & STERILITY 527, 527 (2004).
270 Id. at 528.
271 Kirstin Mac Dougall et al., Strategiesfor Disclosure:How ParentsApproach Telling
Their Children that They Were Conceived with Donor Gametes, 87 FERTILITY & STERILITY
524, 525 (2007).
269
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time." 27 2 Parents who choose the seed-planting method-begun at age
three or four-believe it will result in children feeling they have always
known about their origins.273 Disclosing early avoids the danger of waiting
too long and giving the appearance of shame or concealment. 274 Parents
who prefer the right time strategy-usually initiated at age six or sevenwant to ensure the child is emotionally able to process the information and
formulate appropriate questions. 275 When disclosure fails to occur by age
eight, the chances of it occurring at all diminish as the child gets older.276
Regardless of the chosen method, none of the parents studied by Kirstin
Mac Dougall and her colleagues who were candid with their children
reported a negative outcome, and none regretted the decision to disclose.2 77
In the United States, traditional gamete donor programs provide only
non-identifying donor information-the type of data, such as physical and
278
An
personality traits, generally used to match donors and recipients.
increasing number of programs allow recipients to opt for open-identity
donors who agree to permit disclosure of their identities to offspring who
request it.279 The Identity-Release Program, offered by The Sperm Bank of
California, authorizes donors to release their identities to. offspring at least
eighteen years of age but imposes no obligation to meet them. 2 80 Research
on DI offspring, ages twelve to seventeen, with open-identity donors found
that most described themselves as having always known about their
281
origins, with the average age of disclosure at less than seven years.
Most felt comfortable with their origins and overwhelmingly curious about
their donor.282 They wanted to know what he was like as a person, what he
looked like, whether he had a family and what they were like, and whether
the donor resembled them in any way. 283 The primary thing they wanted
was a photograph, and on average, they reported being moderately to very
272 Id. at 526.
273

id.
id
275 Id. at 527.
276 Id. at 531.
274

277

id

J. E. Scheib et al., Adolescents with Open-Identity Sperm Donors: Reportsfrom
1217 Year Olds, 20 HuM. REPROD. 239, 239 (2004).
279 id.
280 See id. at
241.
278

281

Id. at 242.
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Id. at 243-44.

283

Id. at 245-46.
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likely to request their donor's identity. 28 About two-thirds envisioned
forming a relationship with their donor, most often a friendship, rather than
a parent-child relationship.2 85 The study's findings "provide little support
for the stereotype that offspring are looking for a father in their donor."286
In 2000, Wendy Kramer and her donor-conceived son, Ryan, created
the Donor Sibling Registry (DSR), a website aimed at bringing donor
children together.287 By posting the name of the sperm bank or egg donor
program and the number assigned to the donor, DSR registrants can look
for matches between half siblings and possibly donor parents. 28 As of
2010, DSR's registrants numbered nearly 29,000, with more than 7,700
matches among registrants, half siblings, and donors.2 89
Less is known about donor interest in establishing relationships with
offspring, although most are curious to know what their offspring are
like. 290 Mike Rubino is a donor father who agreed to meet his offspring,
Aaron, age seven and Leah, age three. 2 91 Accompanied to the visit by their
single mother, the children, especially Aaron, seemed primed to accept this
new acquaintance into their lives.292 Compared with other types of
households, children of single-parent households have significantly more
positive feelings about their donor.29 3 Aaron, whose wish for a dad was for
someone "to play with me," bonded with Mike almost immediately. 294 The
two discovered much in common and, despite a promise to keep in touch,
Mike, an artist who
found it painful to separate at the visit's end. 9
treasures his solitude, later established contact with several more
offspring. 296 But his fatherly welcome has its limits. "I'm a little
concerned if any others come forward," he said, "only because I don't

284
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Id. at 248.
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know how much time I could spend with everyone.
A single donor can
298
have "at least twenty identified offspring."
The children sired by Fairfax
Donor 1476, number approximately forty, and have their own website. 2 99
Several donors, overwhelmed by donor offspring contact requests, have
withdrawn their identifying information from the DSR. 0 0 "Not everyone,"
observed Liza Mundy, "wants to be part of an unprecedented extended
family."30
Whatever our assumptions about surrogates, donors, and the children
of ART, the empirical realities are sometimes surprising or even
counterintuitive. Questions of familial ties, rights, and responsibilities
have never been simple, and these new reproductive technologies roil the
waters even more. As the culture more fully absorbs family-fashioning
innovations, law and policy will, eventually, catch up with them. In the
interim, our notions of what is ideal and what is functional drift further and
further apart, exposing discomfiture and ambivalence in legal and
legislative thinking. Clarity and certainty are still a long way off. But in
the years since Baby M., practical experience and research have aimed to
unseat moral rhetoric and blind theorizing, lighting a path toward
anchoring law and policy in the known world of living families.
IV. PARENTHOOD IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE EVOLVING

LEGAL STANDARDS
The issue of parentage can no longer be confined to a box labeled birth
or adoptiveparent. As countless Americans have shown, "individuals may
comprise a legally cognizable family through means other than biological
or adoptive."302 Children are being born into families whose composition
differs radically from the married heterosexual dyad of common law
vintage.303 Retaining an exclusively biological nexus to parenthood runs
297 MUNDY, supra note
29

8

43, at 168.

d. at 173.
299
Id. at 170
1

Id. at 173.
Id. at 172.
302 In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 169 (Wash.
2005).
303 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (plurality opinion) (noting that "[t]he
demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American
family"); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.3 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (plurality
opinion) (noting that although "[t]he family unit accorded traditional respect in our society,
which we have referred to as the 'unitary family,' is typified, of course, by the marital
family, [it] also includes the household of unmarried parents and their children").
300
301
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counter to the reality of how these new families are formed. 3 0 Twentyfirst century American families have arranged themselves in many
different ways. Unmarried couples-both heterosexual and homosexualare recalibrating the cultural norms for family life, raising children, and
relating to each other and to the larger community as members of a
family. 305 Married couples and their children now form a minority of
households.0
Yet our legal system has not kept pace with cultural
change.307 Family law statutes still largely envision an Ozzie and Harriet
world in which families appear as two heterosexual spouses and their
biological children.30 s
But major changes are afoot. The legal system is in the process of
shifting from biological to functional norms. Families may now be
"characterized by two or more persons related by birth, adoption, marriage,
or choice."309 Their key elements are "socioemotional ties and enduring
responsibilities, particularly in terms of one or more members' dependence
on others for support and nurturance., 310 Courts are the beachhead for this
3
See, e.g., N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 359 (Colo. 2000) (observing that
"[p]arenthood in our complex society comprises much more than biological ties, and
litigants increasingly are asking courts to address issues that involve delicate balances
between traditional expectations and current realities").
305 See DiFonzo & Stem, supra note 46, at 38 ("The citadel of the biological/adoptive
family has for some years been besieged by the burgeoning segment of nontraditional
families."); see also Hofstad v. Christie, 240 P.3d 816, 820 (Wyo. 2010) ("Even if [the
parties] are not married, nor related by blood, that they lived together on and off for
approximately ten years, all the while sharing an intimate relationship which resulted in the
birth of their twins is evidence that a family relationship exists.").
3 See DiFonzo & Stem, supra note 46, at 23.
307 See generally Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A
Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REv. 1035 (2002) (describing the
difficulties of achieving legal acceptance of reproductive technologies); Catherine DeLair,
Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted Reproductive Technologies
Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 147 (2000)
(describing similar difficulties, with particular focus on the difficulties experienced by gay
men and lesbians).
308 See generally DeLair, supra note 307, at 162-73 (noting assumptions in the legal
world).
3
Katherine R. Allen et al., An Overview of Family Diversity: Controversies,
Questions, and Values, in HANDBOOK OF FAMILY DIVERSITY 1 (David H. Demo et al. eds.,
2000).
31o Id.; see also CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK
COMMUNITY 31 (1996) (viewing a family as "the smallest, organized, durable network of
(continued)
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revolution, because society is evolving faster than the formal legal system,
and disputes are often presented to judges who have little statutory or case
law guidance in these new areas.31' In assessing these dilemmas of modern
family life, one state supreme court suggested a growing receptivity to the
actual parenting arrangements and family structure the parties themselves
have made:
The recognition of de facto parents is in accord with
notions of the modern family. An increasing number of
same gender couples, like the plaintiff and the defendant,
are deciding to have children. It is to be expected that
children of nontraditional families, like other children,
form parent relationships with both parents, whether those
parents are legal or de facto.

. .

. Thus, the best interests

calculus must include an examination of the child's
relationship with both his legal and de facto parent.3 12
The rapid pace of change in reproductive technologies has created a
yawning gulf between the realities of family life and most statutorily
prescribed norms.
Legislative dictates are supposed to guide the
judiciary in adjudicating these disputes, but legislatures are not revising the
kin and non-kin who interact daily, providing domestic needs of children and assuring their
survival").
311 See DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 46, at 38-39 ("Courts
are gradually-and
legislatures more gradually still-recognizing the pervasiveness of alternative family forms
by allocating legal rights and burdens to 'equitable parents' equivalent to biological and
adoptive families." (citations omitted)).
312 E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999) (internal citations omitted).
A de facto parent is one who has no biological relation to the child, but
has participated in the child's life as a member of the child's family.
The de facto parent resides with the child and, with the consent and
encouragement of the legal parent, performs a share of caretaking
functions at least as great as the legal parent.
Id. "The de facto parent shapes the child's daily routine, addresses his developmental
needs, disciplines the child, provides for his education and medical care, and serves as a
moral guide." Id. The American Law Institute has promulgated a definition of de facto
parent grounded in living with the child in an arrangement between the legal parent and the
de facto parent.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 118 (2002).
313 See In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 165 (Wash. 2005) (referring to the
"advancing technologies and evolving notions of what comprises a family unit").
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statutory schemes fast or thoroughly enough.3 14 Courts often employ caseby-case adjudication in these broad policy areas when they find "statutory
silence regarding the interests of children begotten by artificial
insemination, and the rights and responsibilities of adults in such parenting
arrangements."3 15 Silence is a two-edged statutory sword, however. Some
314 See J.F. v. D.B., 848 N.E.2d 873, 881 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (Slaby, J., concurring).
Consider the plaintive and not-infrequent note struck by the appellate judge:

The Ohio legislators have acknowledged but failed to address the rapid
technological advances of surrogacy. The majority and I want to again
emphasize that we do not address custody issues in this case. The case
is the foundation of many and various issues to be decided by the state
legislators or courts of the future. Extrapolating from the facts of this
case, one can only imagine what the future can bring, the issues that
will be raised, and the variety of conclusions that can result without
legislative regulation.
The majority points out that there are only a few states that have
even begun to address the issue of determining who the parents of a
surrogate child may be. Even the few states that have begun to address
the issues involved have approached the issues from four different
directions. Unless the state legislators begin to address the multiple
issues involved, it will be the children that will be caught in a continual
tug of war between the egg donor or donors, the sperm donor or donors,
the surrogate parent or parents, and those that simply want to adopt a
child from what they perceive as the ideal parents. Id.
3
In re L.B., 122 P.3d at 169 n.9. A small number of state statutes furnish exceptions
to the general legislative languor in this area. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.270
(West 2004) (defining "de facto custodian" as "a person who has been shown by clear and
convincing evidence to have been the primary caregiver for, and financial supporter of, a
child who has resided with the person for [specified time periods]" and directing that in
determining custody "equal consideration . . . be given to each parent and to any de facto
custodian"). The Kentucky Court of Appeals noted that the statute is intended to afford
"standing in a present custody matter to non-parents who have assumed a sufficiently
parent-like role in the life of the child." Sullivan v. Tucker, 29 S.W.3d 805, 807-08 (Ky.
Ct. App. 2000). An Oregon statute provides for the rights of an individual "who establishes
emotional ties creating child-parent relationship." OR. REv. STAT. § 109.119 (2009). The
statute defines such a relationship in psychological, physical, and temporal terms:

"Child-parent relationship" means a relationship that exists or did
exist, in whole or in part, within the six months preceding the filing of
an action under this section, and in which relationship a person having
physical custody of a child or residing in the same household as the
(continued)
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judges see legislative silence as a golden opportunity to behave like
traditional common law judges, filling in the interstices with the
accumulated wisdom of similar cases in light of evolving norms.
Other
judges find a different solace in silence. They limit their job to applying
the statutes as written, and they toss the policy dilemmas back to the
legislature.317
child supplied, or otherwise made available to the child, food, clothing,
shelter and incidental necessaries and provided the child with necessary
care, education and discipline, and which relationship continued on a
day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay and
mutuality, that fulfilled the child's psychological needs for a parent as
well as the child's physical needs. However, a relationship between a
child and a person who is the nonrelated foster parent of the child is not
a child-parent relationship under this section unless the relationship
continued over a period exceeding 12 months.
Id. § 109.119(10)(a). See In re Marriage of O'Donnell-Lamont, 91 P.3d 721, 731 (Or.
2004) (noting that the statute supplies the legal standard for "determining custody as
between a legal parent ... and other persons who have established a child-parent
relationship with a child").
316
See Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 94 (Md. 2008) (Raker, J., dissenting).
One thing is clear: the Maryland Legislature is silent when it comes to
the question of visitation with children when a non-traditional family is
dissolved. In the face of this silence, I believe that a de facto parent is
different from "third parties" and should be treated as the equivalent of
a legal parent, with the same rights and obligations.
Id.; see also Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 31 (N.Y. 1991) (Kaye, J., dissenting)
("[Virginia's] Domestic Relations Law . .. does not define the term 'parent' at all. That
remains for the courts to do, as often happens when statutory terms are undefined."); James
Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unfied Field Theory of the Family: The American Law
Institute's Principlesof the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REv. 923, 933 (2001)
("In order to accommodate the best interests of the children of these nontraditional unions,
courts have begun re-commissioning and adapting doctrines from equity practice in order to
adjust the statutory definition.").
317 See, e.g., In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 132 (Md. 2007) (Cathell, J., dissenting).
This case illustrates that the process of manufacturing children can
lead to unusual situations that would have been virtually inconceivable
decades ago when the relevant statutory scheme was enacted. I do not
necessarily agree or disagree that the remedy for the present situation
created by the majority is appropriate or otherwise. I think it is wrong
for the majority to fashion, in the first instance, the public policy it is
(continued)
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A. Equitable Relief How Judges Deal with Missing or Ill FittingStatutes
Reproductive technology cases are not unique in forcing a
reexamination of what constitutes a family.3 18 Nor are they the first
domestic phenomenon to pit judicial reticence against legislative inertia,
prodding one or the other into finally taking up the reins of decisionmaking.3 19 Given the flood of nontraditional family cases, the legislative
vacuum is leading to a transformation in the judicial allocation of parenting
rights and obligations. A selection of recent cases-many of them
controversial-illustrates the broad dimensions of the rift between law and
culture in the construction of the modern family and suggests movement
toward an eventual resolution premised on functional norms in surrogacy
and related cases.320 It bears emphasizing that the trend in these cases is
essentially conservative, in the sense that the courts are aiming to preserve
the parental status quo. 3 2 ' The forces aiming to upend the established
family structure are staking their claim on traditional legal norms, which
admittedly never contemplated the variety of family structures at play in
American culture today.
The task of apportioning parental rights and duties in a divided family
is always a difficult one.322 But it is even harder in these nontraditional
creating as a remedy. The issues present in this case, going as they do
to the very heart of a society, are, in my view, a matter for the
Legislative Branch of government and not initially for the courts.
Id.; see also In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 162 (W.Va. 2005) (Maynard, J., dissenting)
("Although families in our society today have taken on new forms, many have not yet been
recognized by our Legislature. In my opinion, this Court should not impose its judgment
where the Legislature has not spoken.").
318 See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-06 (1976) (reversing a
criminal conviction under an ordinance that narrowly defined the term "family" in light of
historical non-lineal composition of families).
See In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d at 153-54 (addressing a statutory gap and
recognizing same-sex partner's right to intervene and challenge the custody award of
deceased partners' biological child to child's maternal grandfather).
320 See, e.g., A.H. v. M.P., 857 N.E.2d 1061, 1069-70 (Mass. 2006) (explaining the
recognition of the de facto parent doctrine).
321 Id. at 106465 (establishing that this case was not "about ensuring that families in
which parents are of the same gender" have the same level of structure and stability
provided to heterosexual parents by law but merely "about the best interests of the child"
where one parent demonstrated "an inability to place the child's needs above her own").
322 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Williams, 90 P.3d 365, 370 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding the "exceptional case" language of Kansas' divorce decree statute to require an
(continued)

THE CHILDREN OF BABY M.

2011]

381

cases. The pressure brought to bear on the family and children as a result
of the separation of the adult partners is often compounded by the
argument that one of the adults who was parenting the children-and was
accepted in that role by both the other partner and the children-is actually
an interloper, a legal stranger to the family.3 2 3
Maintaining the parent-child bonds in cases where families break up is
an emotionally taxing enterprise, but it is a charge family courts have
undertaken for generations. In cases where children's welfare is in
jeopardy, the premise for court intervention is found in most states' general
equity powers.324 The basis for recognition of de facto parenting stems
from the principle .'that disruption of a child's preexisting relationship
with a nonbiological parent can be potentially harmful to the child,' thus
warranting State intrusion into the private realm of the family." 3 25
Courts employing equity in these circumstances are sometimes
accused of engaging in "judicial lawmaking." 3 26 But that is an oddly inapt
categorization to describe the process of enforcing the rules the family
created for itself and lived by long enough to establish a cognizable family

individualized, case-by-case approach based on all the evidence to determine if divided
custody was allowable).
323 A.H., 857 N.E.2d at 1065 (rejecting same-sex partner's argument that she
was a de
facto parent or parent by estoppel, not a legal stranger to her partner's child in a custody
dispute).
324

Id. at 1070.

Id. (quoting Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1061 (Mass. 2002)); see also Jennifer
L. Rosato, Children of Same-Sex Parents Deserve the Security Blanket of the Parentage
Presumption, 44 FAM. CT. REv. 74, 74 (2006) (arguing that the parentage presumption
"should apply equally to children born of a same-sex marriage, domestic partnership, or
civil union, as well as to children who live with a same-sex partner in a parent-child
relationship").
325

To protect children from the emotional harm of being abruptly cut off
from one of the only two parents they have ever known, courts in a
growing number of states have heeded the call of Nancy Polikoff and
others, and have applied a variety of judge-made equitable and common
law doctrines to fill in the gaps and to ensure that children are provided
with at least a minimal level of protection for their emotional and
caregiving relationships with their functional but nonlegal parents.
Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage,Gender, and Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1178 (2010) (footnote omitted).
326 E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 894 (Mass. 1999) (Fried, J., dissenting).
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structure.327 It is difficult, for example, to make sense of a dissenting
justice labeling a decision as "anti-family" which held that a woman
should be awarded parenting rights when she lived in an intimate
relationship with the child's biological mother, shared in the decision to
bring the child into the world, helped plan the birthing, helped create a
nursery in which to care for the child upon his arrival, and "mothered" the
child from birth until the death of his biological mother.328 Such a decision
may contradict some homophobic views of what constitutes an appropriate
family life, but it clearly affirms the particular family in which this child
was raised and allocates parenting rights to the only living parent the child
has ever known.
Shaping family law through equitable principles is inevitably
controversial because it involves significant tension between the court's
general equity power and specific statutory commands, which may not
address the issue presented. The Washington Supreme Court fittingly
characterized the judicial dilemma in these situations: "[W]e are asked to
discern whether, in the absence of a statutory remedy, the equitable power
of our courts in domestic matters permits a remedy outside of the statutory
scheme, or conversely, whether our state's relevant statutes provide the
exclusive means of obtaining parental rights and responsibilities."329
See, e.g., Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 204 (N.Y. 2010) (Smith, J.,
concurring) ("Each of these couples made a commitment to bring a child into a two-parent
family, and it is unfair to the children to let the commitment go unenforced.").
328 In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 161 (W.Va. 2005) (Maynard, J., dissenting) ("I am
dismayed that this Court has written an opinion that is so anti-family."). But see id. at 154,
158-60 (describing the comprehensive nature and extent of the parent-child relationship
between Tina B. and Z.B.S. that persuaded the majority of the court).
329 In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 166 (Wash. 2005) (emphasis in original); see
also id. (noting that state courts have also "invoked their equity powers and common law
responsibility . .. in spite of legislative enactments that may have spoken to the area of law,
but did so incompletely").
Sometimes a court relies on a statute whose terms appear only inferentially to apply to
the case. See, e.g., In re ClifordK., 619 S.E.2d at 147. The West Virginia Supreme Court
held that a deceased mother's lesbian partner had standing to seek custody of the child
conceived and born during their relationship and jointly raised by them. Id. at 143. The
court relied on the provisions of W. VA. CODE § 48-9-103(b), which provides that "[i]n
exceptional cases the court may, in its discretion, grant permission to intervene to other
persons or public agencies whose participation in the proceedings under this article it
determines is likely to serve the child's best interests." Id. at 147-48. The court defined
"exceptional cases" as those "when intervention is likely to serve the best interests of the
subject child(ren)." Id at 143. The court held that, in these exceptional cases, a
(continued)
327
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Decisions affording equitable relief in these parenting cases have not gone
unchallenged; at times, they have been furiously opposed by dissenting
judges and contradicted by decisions in other courts.
In 1999, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed equity
jurisdiction to grant visitation to the former same-sex partner of the
biological mother of the child.330 The evidence showed that the women
jointly made the decision to have the child and that the partner had fully
co-parented the child with the biological mother, who had consented to the
initiation and continuation of this family structure.33 1 Each woman had
always referred to the other as the child's parent, and the child told people
that he has two mothers, one he called "Mommy," and the other he called
"Mama." 3 32 The court held that the partner had become the child's de facto
parent, and thus, was entitled to visitation.3 This resolution mirrored and
carried forward the very family arrangements that the couple created for
themselves and the child.334 Nonetheless, the decision prompted a pointed
dissent, challenging the use of equity to circumvent (as the dissent saw it)
established legal principles:
The probate judge's order in this case was wholly
without warrant in statute, precedent, or any known legal
principle, and yet the majority of this court has upheld it.
As such, the opinion the court delivers today is a
remarkable example of judicial lawmaking. It greatly
expands the courts' equity jurisdiction with respect to the
welfare of children and adopts the hitherto unrecognized

"psychological parent" may properly intervene in a custody proceeding. Id The dissent
contended that the majority had re-written the statute to its liking: "[T]he majority has
resorted to legislating a new class of persons who will now have standing to take part in
custodial disputes even though they have no biological or other statutorily recognized right
to do330so." Id. at 162 (Maynard, J., dissenting).
E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 889-90, 894.
331 Id. at 888-89.
332
Id. at 889.
3 Id.; see also V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 555 (N.J. 2000) (holding that the samesex partner of a biological mother who had assumed a parental role in helping to raise the
biological mother's child had established a "psychological parenthood" with respect to the
child, and thus, had a legal right to petition for custody and visitation).
334 E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 892 (discussing the co-parenting agreement between the
women, which stated that the child would continue his relationship with the plaintiff in the
event the couple's relationship ended).
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principle of de facto parenthood as a sole basis for
ordering visitation. 335
A more recent example of this type of equitable relief may be found in
a 2009 Montana Supreme Court decision affirming the grant of parenting
rights to a lesbian co-parent. 3 In Kulstad v. Maniaci, the majority applied
a state statute, which allowed third parties to acquire parental interests
when the "natural parent has engaged in conduct that is contrary to the
child-parent relationship"; the third party "has established with the child a
child-parent relationship"; and "it is in the best interests of the child to
continue that relationship."3 37 A dissenting justice insisted that the statute
should be struck down as an unconstitutional infringement upon a natural
parent's fundamental rights.338 The dissent further elaborated on the
dangers of wielding equitable principles in order to ascertain parentage:
Today the Court retreats from its clear declaration of
In
the fundamental constitutional rights of parents.
exchange, the Court adopts an equitable, case-by-case
inquiry to determine if a third party should be granted a
parental interest of a child that must be balanced against a
natural parent's rights. The Court's decision will open a
Pandora's Box of potential attacks upon the right of fit and

Id. at 894 (Fried, J., dissenting). The dissent's skeptical view of de facto parenting
found an echo in the reasoning of In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 913 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
335

While it may be true that in our society the term "parent" has become
used at times to describe more loosely a person who shares mutual love
and affection with a child and who supplies care and support to the
child, we find it inappropriate to legislate judicially such a broad
definition of the term "parent" as relating to legal rights relating to child
custody and/or visitation.
Id. at 918 (emphasis in original). By contrast, the Washington Supreme Court noted that
the term de facto parent "describes an individual who, in all respects functions as a child's
actual parent." In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 168 n.7 (Wash. 2005).
3 36
Kulstad v. Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595, 610 (Mont. 2009).
3 37
Id. at 606 (applying MoNT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-228 (2009)).
338 Id. at 613-15 (Rice, J., dissenting).
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capable parents to raise their own children. I dissent from
this weakening of parental constitutional rights.33 9
Another argument against the expansion of equity jurisprudence
targets the judiciary's supposed lack of expertise in family policy. The
argument insists that judges are ill equipped to draft the substantive and
procedural rules governing when child welfare provisions should apply and
when and how they may be modified.3 40 Under this view, fashioning an
equitable parent doctrine forces a court "to improvise, as it goes along,
substantive standards and procedural rules about when legal custody may
be modified, what terms and conditions may be set, and other matters that
already have well-charted passageways under state statutes and related
court decisions."341
The problem with this view is that the "well-charted passageways"342
are now full of nontraditional families whose very composition challenges
established notions of family law.
Our "dominant legal norm" posits
3 Id. at 611. Arguably, the majority was interpreting a statute and not relying on
equitable principles. See id. at 606-10 (majority opinion) (applying the particular facts of
the case to the elements of the Montana statute to determine whether the district court's
decision to award Kulstad a parental interest should be upheld). But the dissent objected to
the "equitable, case-by-case inquiry," which would follow from the majority's
interpretation of the statutory framework. Id. at 611 (Rice, J., dissenting).
340 See, e.g., Debra H. v. Janice R., 904 N.Y.S.2d 263, 272-73 (N.Y. 2010) (refusing to
"sidestep[] [New York law] as presently drafted and interpreted ... to create an additional
category of parent-a functional or de facto parent-through the exercise of [the court's]
common-law and equitable powers" and explaining that such a task is better suited for the
legislature).
341 Cotton v. Wise, 977 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). A similar complaint has
been lodged by maintaining that the legislature is best equipped to deal with the entirety of
a complex issue, while the judiciary of necessity only resolves problems in an incremental
fashion. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 898 (Mass. 1999) (Fried, J.,
dissenting) ("Only the Legislature is in a position to deal systematically and
comprehensively with [the subject of children raised by same-sex partners]. Our imprecise,
indirect, and piecemeal entry into this field can only cause confusion.") Yet, another
objection is lodged by courts, which prefer the clear rules of biology and adoption to what
they view as a complex and prolix alternative: "These equitable-estoppel hearings-which
would be followed by a second, best-interest hearing in the event functional or de facto
parentage is demonstrated to the trial court's satisfaction-are likely often to be
contentious, costly, and lengthy." Debra H., 904 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
342 Cotton, 977 S.W.2d at 265.
343 E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 891 (noting that "notions of the modern family" include
"nontraditional families," such as same-sex couples with children). In discussing
(continued)
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that "family is a heterosexual, marital, biological unit, [but] our social and
cultural patterns expose a culture that is largely at odds with that nuclear,
marital family norm." " But the patterns in our lives so often diverge from
the pathways in our laws, what are courts to do? Parents receive the law's
imprimatur because society considers them central to family life. 345 That
parenthood was once framed in biological terms was a historical
inevitability-virtually a tautological position. But the argument that
parenthood has now been uprooted from its biological grounding and
transplanted into functional soil does not stem from a new conception of
families. 34 6 Rather, it grows out of the same core family tradition-parents
nurture children into adulthood-and that difficult task remains a central

nontraditional families, it is instructive to keep in mind Janet Dolgin's observation that
"[t]he term 'traditional family' refers . . . to a social construct." Janet L. Dolgin, Choice,
Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentationof the Ideology of Family, 32 CONN.
L. REv. 523, 524 (2000); see also JOHN DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT, AND PERSONAL: THE
FAMILY AND THE LIFE COURSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 30-31 (1986) (describing how the
"traditional family" was constructed in the nineteenth century as a product of modem
capitalism).

Nancy E. Dowd, Law, Culture, and Family: The Transformative Power of Culture
and the Limits of Law, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 785, 789 (2003). Not only is our culture at
odds with the family legal system, but there is currently "no consensus even as to what
family law is," and basic issues abound as to the proper composition of the family itself.
Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy, Interdependence, and
Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265, 269 (2000); see also Jane C. Murphy,
Rules, Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in
Family Law, 60 U. PITr. L. REv. 1111, 1112-15 (1999) (discussing different scholarly
views on the construction of families). The first paragraph of the introduction to a
contemporary family law casebook points out that "fundamental changes in the ways in
which Americans organize their family lives have spurred questions about what were once
34

basic presuppositions of family law." IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES,
TEXT, PROBLEMS 3 (5th ed. 2010).
345 See, e.g., Levi R. Smylie, Strengthening Our Families: An In-Depth Look at the

Proclamationon the Family, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 375, 376 (2004) (noting that family is a
"central component[] of our society" and discussing the "important and distinct roles" that
parents occupy within a family).
3" See, e.g., Dolgin, supra note 343, at 524-25 (stating that today's modem family
comes in many forms, despite the traditional belief that family ties flow from biology, and
expressing the hope that regardless of an individual's view of familial relationships,

"families will resemble one another in placing love and loyalty before all else").
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socializing fact of our culture.347 The "equitable parent" cases all attempt
to answer the same question that biological parenthood presupposed: 348
Who has been raising this child?34 9
Some judges justify maintaining a key role for equity jurisprudence on
the ground that the primary institutional expertise in family law resides in
the courts. "The Legislature is ill-equipped to deal with the myriad
situations in which children find themselves.
It has long been a
foundational tenet of American jurisprudence that, when legal remedies
prove inadequate to solve a problem, society looks to the doctrine of equity
and the courts."o
Consider the "psychological parenthood" test adopted by the New
Jersey Supreme Court.7
In order for a "third party" to become legally
347 See Katherine T. Bartlett, Saving the Familyfrom the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIs L.
REV. 809, 816 (1998) ("[F]avor[ing] respect or moral accommodation for a broad range of
family forms that are capable of providing nurturing environments to its members.").
348 CompareE.N.0, 711 N.E.2d at 892 (discussing the plaintiffs participation in raising
the child and determining that the plaintiff was the child's "de facto parent"), Kulstad v.
Maniaci, 220 P.3d 595, 609-10 (Mont. 2009) (discussing the child-parent relationship that
existed between the plaintiff and the child), and V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 555 (N.J.
2000) (discussing the plaintiffs involvement in the child's life and the plaintiffs
assumption of many parental obligations), with Dolgin, supra note 343, at 524 (quoting
anthropologist David M. Schneider, who explained that "[i]f science discovers new facts
about biogenetic relationship, then that is what kinship is and was all along").
349 It bears reiterating how limited the scope of the de facto or equitable parent doctrine
truly is, as it applies only when the parent in question has "undertaken a permanent,
unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child's life." Philbrook v.
Theriault, 957 A.2d 74, 79 (Me. 2008) (quoting C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1152
(Me. 2004)).
350
Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15,27 (Mich. 1999) (Kelly, J., dissenting).
351 V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 553 (N.J. 2000). The New Jersey
Supreme Court
largely adopted the test set out by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Holtzman v. Knott, 533
N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995). Id. Many other jurisdictions have recognized common law
rights on behalf of psychological or de facto parents. See, e.g., In re Interest of E.L.M.C.,
100 P.3d 546, 558-61 (Colo. App. 2004) (finding a compelling state interest in preventing
harm to a child satisfies strict scrutiny analysis and affirming recognition of "psychological
parent" doctrine in context of former same-sex partner's petition for equal parenting time);
C.E. W., 845 A.2d at 1151-52 (recognizing de facto parents and placing them in parity with
statutory parents); E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 893-94 (holding that the trial court had
jurisdiction to award visitation between child and de facto parent); A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d
660, 663 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing same-sex dual parent relationship and
reversing the trial court's ruling that the co-parenting agreement was unenforceable); In re
(continued)
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recognized as a co-parent, four steps are required.352 The legal parent
"must consent to and foster the relationship between the third party and the
Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241, 247-49 (Ohio 2002) (holding that because the state statute
specifically defined "parent," the court found it "inappropriate to .. . broaden the narrow
class of persons" to include the biological mother's same-sex partner; and thus, the partner
was "not entitled to the benefit of statutes that are clearly inapplicable to such a familial
arrangement," but concluding that courts do have jurisdiction to consider a petition for
shared custody as not preempted by statute); T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 914 (Pa. 2001)
(concluding the lesbian partner "assumed a parental status and discharged parental duties
with the consent of [the biological mother]," and thus, has standing as person in loco
parentis to bring an action for partial custody and visitation); Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d
959, 975-76 (R.I. 2000) (finding no "infer[ence] [of] legislative intent to preclude standing
to a de facto parent" and concluding that "a person who has no biological connection to a
child but who has served as a psychological or de facto parent to that child
may ... establish his or her entitlement to parental rights vis-i-vis the child"); Middleton v.
Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 167 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that an ex-boyfriend who lived
with the child for nine years should be recognized as a psychological parent or de facto
parent and gain visitation rights); In re J.W.F., 799 P.2d 710, 714 (Utah 1990) ("[T]he fact
that a person is not a child's natural or legal parent does not mean that he or she must stand
as a total stranger to the child where custody is concerned. Certain people, because of their
relationship to a child, are at least entitled to standing to seek a determination as to whether
it would be in the best interests of the child for them to have custody."); In re Parentage of
L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176 (Wash. 2005) (holding the state's common law recognizes de facto
parents); In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 140 (W.Va. 2005) (noting that the former
lesbian partner of the deceased biological mother "was child's psychological parent and
unusual and extraordinary circumstances existed").
Other jurisdictions have rejected this analysis. See, e.g., Egan v. Fridlund-Horne, 211
P.3d 1213, 1221 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) ("[W]e sharply disagree with the bold
pronouncement of the Washington Supreme Court [In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161
(Wash. 2005)] that, if a person can establish standing as a de facto parent, then that person
has a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of the child, to the same
extent as the legal parent."); Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 73 (Md. 2008) ("[Dje
facto parent status is not recognized as a legal status in Maryland."); In re Thompson, 11
S.W.3d 913, 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to recognize de facto parent status).
352 VC., 748 A.2d at 551. Deeming one of the lesbian co-parents as a "third party"
petitioner has been criticized as a distorted way to approach basic issues in a family created
by two lesbian co-parents. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal
Stranger:Adjudicating Maternity for NonbiologicalLesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REv.
341, 350 (2002).
Lesbian coparents are anything but third parties-they are involved,
nurturing, loving, and supportive parents. Lesbian coparents are
different from traditional third parties because they intend and plan,
(continued)
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child; the third party must have lived with the child; the third party must
perform parental functions for the child to a significant degree; and most
important, a parent-child bond must be forged." 353
The psychological parent analysis exemplifies how courts act to
protect children who may be harmed unless creative judicial solutions are
developed to fill the gaps in statutory enactments.3 54 But the accusations of
"judicial lawmaking" ring particularly hollow when applied to this
equitable doctrine.3
A close reading of the first prong of the test
illustrates how closely this doctrine mirrors traditional norms of family
governance and child welfare.5 The issue of psychological parenthood is
raised only if co-parenting was intended and acted upon by the original
biological or adoptive parent. 357 The creation of shared parenthood for a
particular child is, thus, entirely within the control of the original legal
parent of that child.
However, the legal parent cannot have it both ways. She cannot
"invite a third party to function as a parent to her child" and then later
pretend, once that parent-child relationship has matured, that the family she
helped bring into being never existed.3 ' 9 A sensible estoppel principle
should bar this argument. But more fundamentally, rejecting this argument
is implicit in the central child welfare task of the courts: avoiding injury to
children. Severing an established parent-child relationship harms a child,
with their partner's agreement and encouragement, to be a parent.
Lesbian coparents thus actively participate in the decision to create a
family and, indeed, function as parents. But, because under existing
law and court practice lesbian coparents are not protected by state
divorce or parentage statutes, they are denied legal recognition of their
actual parental role. Id.
SV.C., 748 A.2d at 551.
354 See Simons ex rel Simons v. Gisvold, 519 N.W.2d 585, 587 (N.D. 1994) (identifying
the purpose of psychological parent analysis as "prevent[ing] serious harm or detriment to
the welfare of the child"); see also LB., 122 P.3d at 166.
3 E.N.O., 711 N.E.2d at 894 (Fried, J., dissenting).
3s6 V.C, 748 A.2d at 551 ("[T]hat the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and
fostered, the petitioner's formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the
child....").
317 Id. at 552 (noting that this prong "is critical because it makes the biological or
adoptive parent a participant in the creation of the psychological parent's relationship with
the child").
358 See id. ("That parent has the absolute ability to maintain a zone of autonomous
privacy for herself and her child.").
35

id.
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whether that relationship began through biological means or following the
invitation of and cultivation by the legal parent. 3 60 As every matrimonial
lawyer and judge knows, child custody battles in divorce courts frequently
involve the cruel display of one parent trying to deny the other parent
contact with their child.36' When the second parent is a psychological or
de facto parent, the spectacle is no less barbaric, and the potential harm to
the child no less ruinous. As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed, the
law should follow the psychological reality of family life: "At the heart of
the psychological parent cases is a recognition that children have a strong
interest in maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who love and
provide for them."3 62 And as the South Dakota Supreme Court similarly
emphasized, "[T]he temporal, mental and moral welfare of children are
paramount. This strikes the proper balance between a natural parent's
custodial rights to his or her child and the child's personal welfare.
Children come first."36 3
This acceptance of the familial status quo also has constitutional
moorings. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that "freedom of
personal choice in matters of.. . family life is one of the liberties protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 364 Equity
powers may be employed creatively under these circumstances. But they
are designed to conserve, to the extent feasible, the family structure, which
the parties themselves adopted when they were contemplating a shared
family life rather than when they were crafting a tactical litigation
position. 365 The goal is always to maintain the particular family that stands
before the court, to the extent possible. Equity in these cases begins by
recognizing "the emotional bonds that develop[ed] between family
members as a result of shared daily life," particularly the parent-child
relationships.
The outr6 legal position in these cases is not the one taken by courts
deploying equity solutions to bolster the family created by the parties
360 See

361

id.

See FLORENCE BIENENFELD,

CHILD CUSTODY

MEDIATION: TECHNIQUES FOR

COUNSELORS, ATTORNEYS AND PARENTS 1 (1983).

VC., 748 A.2d at 550.
Quinn v. Mouw-Quinn, 552 N.W.2d 843, 847 (S.D. 1996).
3 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974).
365 See VC., 748 A.2d at 547
n.4.
366 Id. at 550; see also Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. &
Reform, 431 U.S.
816, 843 (1977) (noting that "biological relationships are not [the] exclusive determination
of the existence of a family").
362

363
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themselves. Instead, it is a position taken in many of the lesbian coparenting cases, known as a "chutzpah" argument." 3 67 In this argument,
the biological or adoptive parent claims that the woman whom she invited
to share in her life and co-parent her child, and who has with her consent
and cooperation for several years "on a continuing, day-to-day basis,
through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfill[ed] the
child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical
needs," should now legally be deemed a stranger to the child.3 68 This
argument is not creditable. Rather, equity should reject, as a form of
"unclean hands," the position articulated by the biological or adoptive
parent seeking to deny the family structure that she worked so hard to
establish.
B. Equity Principlesin Reproductive Technology Cases
When considering the current legal standards found in surrogacy and
other reproductive technology cases, it is best to look back at the Baby M.
litigation in the late 1980s. Elizabeth Scott has etched that picture well,
referring to the "dramatic and emotional legal battle between a housewife
who had dropped out of high school and a couple with graduate degrees
and professional careers who sought to have a child with her assistance."369
During the case proceedings and in the wake of the Baby M decision,
surrogacy was portrayed as involving the selling of babies and the
exploitation of women. 3 70 The case generated very powerful emotional,
ideological, and political responses, focusing "national attention on the

A recent opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
explains the word and its derivation:
"Chutzpah" as a legal term of art is analytically similar to "unclean
hands," though not necessarily coterminous with that concept as
understood in Chancery. The "classic definition" of chutzpah has been
described as "that quality enshrined in a man who, having killed his
mother and father, throws himself on the mercy of the court because he
is an orphan."
Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 561 F.3d 123, 128 n.5 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting LEO ROSTEN,
THE JOYS OF YIDDISH 92 (1968)).
368 Simmons v. Comer, 438 S.E.2d 530, 540 n.15 (W.Va. 1993)
(quoting JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

Scott, supra note 2, at 113.
0
See id. at 116-17.

369

98 (1979)).
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issue and fram[ing] the practice as commodification.",3 1 Nearly all the
statutes enacted in the period after the New Jersey Supreme Court decision
in Baby M either banned surrogacy contracts or discouraged them by
forbidding payments to the surrogate or to intermediaries, or by giving
surrogates the right to rescind after the birth of the baby.37 2
But this public denigration of surrogacy did not last very long. By the
early 1990s, opposition began to fade.373 In New Jersey (the state which,
because of Baby M, took the lead in condemning surrogacy), a bill
banning the practice was introduced in the state legislature in 1993.374 It
was based on the recommendations of a task force appointed by New
Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, which studied surrogacy exhaustively for
four years.37 s But the bill died without any fanfare, and it has never been
reintroduced.376
What happened? Perhaps the answer to the puzzling change in legal
and social milieu is that the scientific answers made the legal questions
more complicated. Reproductive technology rapidly developed a facility
for accomplishing gestational surrogacy, in which the gestational carrier
provides the womb but not the egg. 37 7 As with Baby M surrogacy, in vitro
fertilization is used to implant an embryo into the surrogate. 7 But this
embryo contains no genetic material from the woman who is to give
birth. 37 9 The egg and the sperm come from other sources: one or both of
Id. at 113. In New York, the Council on Children and Families and the Division for
Women maintained that surrogacy "reinforces the notion that women and children are
chattels." Id. at 119.
37
1 d. at 117.
373 Id. at 120.
371

3 74 id.

3 See N.J. Com. ON LEGAL & ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE,
AFTER BABY M: THE LEGAL, ETHICAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF SURROGACY, at iii (1992)

(reporting the findings of the New Jersey Task Force regarding surrogacy and proposed
reform).
376 Scott, supranote 2, at 120.
377
See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
" See generally DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: How MONEY, SCIENCE AND
POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 24-32 (2006) (explaining that the in vitro

fertilization was first successfully demonstrated in 1978 and increased dramatically
beginning the mid-1980s). In 2010, the Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine was
awarded to Robert G. Edwards, a biologist who helped develop the in vitro fertilization
procedure for treating human infertility. See Nicholas Wade, In Vitro FertilizationPioneer

Wins Nobel Prize, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at Al.
3

Levine, supra note 65, at 175.
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the intended parents, anonymous donors, or-more problematically, as a
number of contested cases have shown-a relative or friend who was
promised or who expects to have a role to play in their genetic offspring's
life.3 so Gestational surrogacy quickly became far more common than Baby
M. surrogacy.'
Should there be a legal difference between gestational
and so-called traditional surrogacy?
Increasingly, courts are answering yes. A 1998 Massachusetts case
illustrated the emphatic differences between traditional and gestational
surrogacy.38 2 R.R. v. MH.3 83 involved a "surrogacy parenting agreement"
for a child who was conceived through artificial insemination of the
mother with the father's sperm.384 The parties were married, but not to
each other, and the mother had agreed to a pre-birth transfer of custody to
the father.38 ' The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held the contract
unenforceable because child custody may only be determined by a court
after determining the best interests of the child, and not by the parties via a
pre-birth stipulation.386 The court raised no equitable concerns because the
legal rules governing child custody were clear and obviously had been
traduced by the parties.387 The court stressed that the case "concerns
traditional surrogacy, in which the fertile member of an infertile couple is
one of the child's biological parents."
The court took pains to

See Sharyn Roach Anleu, For Love but Not for Money?, 6 GENDER & Soc'Y 30,
31-33, 36-37 (1992); Martha A. Field, Surrogacy Contracts-Gestationaland Traditional:
The Argumentfor Nonenforcement, 31 Washburn L.J. 1, 7-8 (1991).
381 Field, supra note 380,
at 7.
382 R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass.
1998).
380

383

Id.

384Idt
385

791.

Id.
386 Id. at 796, 797 ("The mother and father may not, however, make
a binding bestinterests-of-the-child determination by private agreement. Any custody agreement is
subject to a judicial determination of custody based on the best interests of the child."); see
also In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (1988) (reaching the same conclusion).
387 R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 797. Even though it found no ambiguity in the guiding legal
principles in this case, the court did make a commonly noted plea for legislative guidance.
Id. ("A Massachusetts statute concerning surrogacy agreements, pro or con, would provide
guidance to judges, lawyers, infertile couples interested in surrogate parenthood, and
prospective surrogate mothers.").
388 Id. at 795. As the court made clear, traditional surrogacy raises concerns akin to
those which arise under adoption cases:
(continued)
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distinguish an unenforceable pre-birth transfer of custody from a
determination of genetic parenthood in a gestational surrogacy case "when
the birth mother has had transferred to her uterus an embryo formed
through in vitro fertilization of the intended parents' sperm and egg."
The legal status of surrogacy today is far from clear. Most states have
not specifically legislated the practice. 9
Some states have outlawed
surrogacy,39 1 whereas others have regulated the practice.392 Not until

The mother's purported consent to custody in the agreement is
ineffective because no such consent should be recognized unless given
on or after the fourth day following the child's birth. In reaching this
conclusion, we apply to consent to custody the same principle which
underlies the statutory restriction on when a mother's consent to
adoption may be effectively given.
Id. at 796.
3 Id at 795 n.10. The Massachusetts high court decided the gestational surrogacy
issue in Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1141 (Mass. 2001).
390 See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Family Law in the Twenty-First Century:
CollaborativeReproduction andRethinking Parentage,21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL 43,
54-55 (2008). See generally Surrogacy Laws: State by State, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN
(2009), http://www.hrc.org/issues/2486.htm; Guide to State Surrogacy Laws, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS (2007), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/12/surrogacy
laws.html/#VP.
'' See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 1999) ("Surrogate parenting
contracts are hereby declared contrary to the public. policy of this state, and are void and
unenforceable.").
392 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15 (2006). In 2004, the Illinois legislature passed the
Gestational Surrogacy Act (GSA), limiting enforcement to gestational surrogacy contracts
and declaring that the intended parents automatically become the child's legal parents at
birth. Id. Other states have passed similar legislation. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10201 (2009) (declaring that the intended parents of children born through gestational
surrogacy are the legal parents of such children); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.213 (West 2005)
(allowing a "preplanned adoption agreement" but not for valuable consideration beyond
expenses and with the opportunity for the mother to rescind consent within seven days); 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15 (2006) (declaring that the intended parents automatically become
the child's legal parents at birth); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(5) (LexisNexis 2010)
(exempting surrogacy agreements from the ban on payment in adoptive placements); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16 (2008) (requiring "judicial preauthorization"); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 160.756 (West 2008) (adopting the Uniform Parentage Act's Article 8, and
thus, providing for judicial validation of a gestational agreement with the effect that "the
intended parents will be the parents of a child bom under the agreement"); VA. CODE
(continued)
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recent years was there adequate common law development to suggest a
compelling rationale. This deficiency in our legal tradition should not be
surprising. As one trial court aptly noted, "[F]or millennia, giving birth
was synonymous with providing the genetic makeup of the child that was
born." 93 The common law was silent on alternative reproduction because
"[b]irth and blood/genetics were one." 394 But for the past several decades,
the assumption that giving birth aligns with a genetic match has weakened
to the point that a legal overhaul is needed. 9 Technology has injected
entropy into this branch of family law: "By the middle of the twentieth
century, issues of legal parenthood were well settled in American law; in
the first decade of the twenty-first century, those issues are hardly settled at
all."396 Collaborative reproduction is forcing a recalibration of governing
norms, beginning with the fundamental question of determining
parentage.397
Initially, courts tended to treat issues that arose in the context of
assisted reproduction by ignoring the reproductive technology and its
implications. For example, in a much-discussed 1991 lesbian co-parenting
case, the New York Court of Appeals refused to grant visitation to a
woman who co-parented a child for over two years with her partner who
had given birth by intrauterine insemination using donor sperm.3 98 The
two women had agreed on a co-parenting arrangement, given the child the
names of both women, and in fact shared the duties of parenting the

§§ 20-160, 20-162 (2008) (providing for prior judicial approval, and reformation of
contracts not approved by the court, to include the designated requirements).
3 Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1994).
ANN.

394

id.

See Kindregan,supra note 390, at 47 ("The separation of biologicalparenthood from
intended parenthood is a truly revolutionary event that throws much of the earlier law of
parenthood into chaos.").
9
Id. at 43.
3 See Amy M. Larkey, Redefining Motherhood: Determining Legal Maternity in
GestationalSurrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REv. 605 (2003). Recent developments
in reproductive technologies have forced courts to confront issues in determining maternity
for the first time in history. See, e.g., In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 122 (Md. 2007)
(considering the novel question of "construing the parentage statutes in a way that affords
women the same opportunity to deny parentage as men have"); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8
introductory cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A 75 (Supp. 2010) ("[B]y definition, a child
born pursuant to a gestational agreement will need to have maternity as well as paternity
clarified.").
398 Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991).
39s
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child. 99 But New York's highest court believed that only biology and
adoption could establish parentage. 40 0 Defining one of the child's coparents as a nonparent allowed the court to reaffirm the prohibition on
extending parenting rights to a nonparent, a point reinforced in a different
context by the U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville.4 o'
In surrogacy and other assisted reproductive technology (ART) cases,
similar considerations govern most judicial efforts to reconcile the rights of
those who claim a seat at the family table. Many courts have recognized
that "[t]he changing realities of modern family life, and the increasing use
of collaborative reproductive technology to procreate children by asexual
means, has forced a reconsideration of the meaning of parenthood."4 0 2
When statutory means are ill fitting or entirely absent, courts may not-as
legislatures often do-simply postpone dealing with the difficult issues
presented to them. Instead, courts must often craft equitable remedies in
an effort to achieve substantial justice between the parties and for the
children and society at large.
A 2010 surrogacy case from the Indiana Court of Appeals illustrates
one court's statutory dilemma and its equity-based resolution.4 03 In re the
Paternityand Maternity ofInfant R. involved the joint petition of a married
couple and the wife's sister to declare the paternity and maternity of an
unborn child. 4 04 An embryo formed from the couple's genetic material was
implanted in the wife's sister, who agreed to serve as a surrogate mother
and give birth to their child.4 05 After the child's birth, the husband
executed an affidavit to acknowledge his paternity of Infant R, which the
399id

400 Id. at 29.

530 U.S. 57 (2000) (upholding on due process grounds the parents' decision
regarding the extent of visitation afforded to the child's grandparents).
402 Kindregan, supra note 390, at 45; see, e.g., Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760,
764
(Ohio Com. Pl. 1994) ("It is apparent that the law must adapt and change to end the
confusion caused by surrogacy. The question is, how will it adapt? Will the genetic test, or
the birth test, or some other means be used to identify those individuals who will be
classified as having the legal status of natural mother in cases such as this one in which the
surrogate has not provided the genetic imprint for the child?").
403 In re the Paternity & Maternity of Infant R., 922 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
401

404

Id. at 60.

Id. As a number of cases illustrate, the sister of an infertile woman (or of a brother
in a same-sex couple) often agrees to serve as a gestational surrogate. See, e.g., id.; Smith
v. Brown, 718 N.E.2d 844, 845 (Mass. 1999); A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., No. FD-09-183807, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 23, 2009); Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 761.
405
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trial court accepted. 40 6 But after a hearing to resolve the issue of the
child's maternity, the trial court found that "Indiana law does not permit a
non birth mother to establish maternity," and thus, held the surrogate to be
the legal mother.407
On appeal, the court acknowledged that "no legislation enacted in this
State specifically provides procedurally for the establishment of maternity;
it is presumed that a woman who gives birth to a child is the child's
biological mother."4 08 But the court did not view the legislative fissure as
fatal to the petition.4 09 The court noted that it was "confronted with
reproductive technologies not contemplated when our Legislature initially
sought to provide for the establishment of legal parentage for biological
parents." 1 o To accept statutory silence as the final word would lead to a
result inconsistent with broad and fundamental family law policies
established by the legislature.
Instead, the appellate court focused on "the public policy embodied" in
the paternity statutes, which, "together with the unique factual
circumstances presented," pointed to the conclusion "that equity should
provide an avenue for relief in this case."412 The court then explained why
rejecting an equitable remedy would run counter to the public policy
expressed in the legislative scheme:
[I]f equity ignores technological realities that the law
has yet to recognize, a child born in the circumstances
alleged herein would be denied the opportunity afforded to
other children of this State, that is, to be legally linked to
those with whom he or she shares DNA. Moreover, a
406
407

Infant R., 922 N.E.2d at 60.
Id. (quoting the trial court).

40s Id. at 61 (citing IND. CODE § 31-9-2-10, which defined, in relevant part, a "birth
parent" to be "the woman who is legally presumed under Indiana law to be the mother of
biological origin").
409 id
410 id
411 Id.
412 Id. The court rejected the parties' joint contention that the state paternity
statutes

should be extended to resolve disputes over maternity: "[I]t is for the Legislature to evaluate
and deliberate comprehensive proposals for changes to these statutes." Id. Cf In re
Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115 (Md. 2007) (holding that under the state equal rights
amendment, paternity statutes apply equally to both males and females, and the process by
which males can challenge paternity can also be employed by females to challenge
maternity).
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woman who has carried a child but is not biologically
related to that child would be denied a remedy available to
putative, but not biological, fathers, that is, the removal of
an incorrect designation on the birth certificate and the
avoidance of legal responsibilities for another person's
child.
We are aware of no reason why the public interest in
correctly identifying a child's biological mother should be
less compelling than correctly identifying a child's
biological father. Indeed, establishing the biological
heritage of a child is the express public policy of this
State.4 13
Under these circumstances, the court deemed itself empowered to
accomplish the legislative purpose through a construction "' contrary to the
strict letter"' of the statute.4 14 Limiting its holding to avoid statutory
redrafting, the court found that the case presented such "narrow
circumstances" as to warrant finding in the paternity statutes a "procedural
template" for allowing the parties to rebut the presumption of maternity
grounded in giving birth.4 15 The court thus remanded the proceedings for
an evidentiary hearing to allow the genetic mother to establish her claim to
maternity.416
Infant R. appears, in one sense, to be an atypical case. Both the
intended parents and the surrogate were on the same side, seeking to have
the genetic mother rather than the gestational surrogate declared the legal
mother.417 But the legal parameters are so new in this area that cases often

Infant R., 922 N.E.2d at 61-62 (citation omitted). In his brief to the appellate court,
appellants' counsel framed the point in more colloquial terms: "That the legal community
has not caught up with the medical community does not absolve the courts from their
obligation to apply our laws fairly and equally to both sexes." Brief for Appellants at 10, In
re the Paternity & Maternity of Infant R., 922 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (No. 64A030908-JV-367), availableat http://indianalawblog.com/documents/Appellant%27s %20Brief
%201nfant%20R%201 -28-10.pdf.
414 Infant R., 922 N.E.2d at 62 (quoting N. Ind. Ry. Co. v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank, 92 N.E.
384, 387 (Ind. Ct. App. 1910)).
415
Id.
416
d.
417
Id. at 61.
413
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arise in the declaratory judgment manner without opposition. 4 18 I
Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts considered whether a trial court had the authority
to grant a declaration of paternity and maternity in an alternative
reproduction case. 4 19 The surrogate gave birth to twins who were the
genetic children of the plaintiffs, pursuant to what the court termed a
"gestational carrier contract."42 0 The trial court had denied relief because
of a "'lack of clarity and certainty"' as to its authority.42 1 On appeal, the
state's highest court agreed that there was no direct authority for relief in
the jurisdiction and noted that legal authority elsewhere was "sparse and
not altogether consistent."42 2
The Culliton case illustrates some of the dilemmas of technological
change outstripping the pace of legislation. The twins "technically were
born out of wedlock, because the gestational carrier was not married when
she gave birth to them. 4 23 Had the surrogate been married, her husband
would have been presumed to be the father of the children to whom she
gave birth.424 But "it is undisputed that they were conceived by a married
couple"; and thus, "the children should be presumed to be the children of
marriage."425 While the paternity statute clearly contemplated sexual
intercourse as a predicate to paternity, "reproductive advances have
eliminated the necessity of having sexual intercourse in order to
procreate.' 2 6 After considering these incompatible presumptions, the
court concluded that the paternity statute "is simply an inadequate and
See, e.g., In re Roberto d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 117 (Md. 2007) (agreeing that the
surrogate's name need not be listed as birth mother where the gestational carrier gave birth
to a child whose genetic material came from donor eggs and father's sperm); Culliton v.
Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133, 1136 (Mass. 2001) (ruling on a
stipulation filed jointly by genetic parents and gestational carrier for the entry of judgment
seeking a declaration that the genetic parents were the children's legal parents); Belsito v.
Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 761-62 (Ohio Com. P1. 1994) (resolving declaratory action by
finding that married couple were the legal parents of the child where the married couple's
embryo was implanted into the wife's sister who gave birth).
419 Culliton, 756 N.E.2d at 1135.
420 id.
421 Id. (quoting the order of the Probate and Family
Court).
422
Id. at 1136.
423 Id. at 1137.
424 id
425 id.
418

426

id
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inappropriate device to resolve parentage determinations of children born
from this type of gestational surrogacy." 427
The adoption statutes also failed to resolve the Culliton case.
Adoption becomes a relevant consideration in traditional surrogacy cases
but not in gestational surrogacy. A "traditional" surrogate is the genetic as
well as the gestational mother of the child she is carrying: "The child is
thus, undisputedly, 'her' child to be surrendered for adoption.'8 2 8
Adoption law must govern any agreement she makes regarding the parental
rights to her child, because she is the legal mother of the child at birth.429
But imposing the adoption law requirements (including in particular the
significant waiting periods) in a gestational surrogacy case makes no sense
because doing so would deprive the genetic parents of their parenting
rights upon birth. 430 Therefore, the court concluded that the adoption
statute "was not intended to resolve parentage issues arising from
gestational surrogacy agreements. 43 '
In holding that the genetic parents were "the lawful parents of the
twins, ,A432 the court acknowledged "the importance of establishing the
rights and responsibilities of parents as soon as is practically possible." 433
The court elaborated on the importance of rapid and accurate
determinations of parentage for minimizing adverse consequences to
children like the Culliton twins:
427

id
Id. In the Uniform Parentage Act, the term "gestational mother" replaced "surrogate
mother," in part so as to avoid confusion:
428

The term ["surrogate mother"] is especially misleading when
"surrogate" refers to a woman who supplies both "egg and womb," that
is, a woman who is a genetic as well as gestational mother. That
combination is now typically avoided by the majority of ART
practitioners in order to decrease the possibility that a
genetic\gestational mother will be unwilling to relinquish her child to
unrelated intended parents.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 introductory cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 75 (Supp.
2010).
429 See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 210, § 2 (West 2010) (requiring consent of mother
before issuance of any adoption decree).
430 Culliton, 756 N.E.2d at 1137-38.
431 Id. at 1138.
432

Id. at 1141.

4 33

Id. at 1139.
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Delays in establishing parentage may, among other
consequences, interfere with a child's medical treatment in
the event of medical complications arising during or
shortly after birth; may hinder or deprive a child of
inheriting from his legal parents should a legal parent die
intestate before a postbirth action could determine
parentage; may hinder or deprive a child from collecting
Social Security benefits. .. and may result in undesirable
support obligations as well as custody disputes (potentially
more likely in situations where the child is born with
congenital malformations or anomalies, or medical
disorders and diseases). Our holding provides that such
consequences, at least in some circumstances, can be
minimized or avoided, thus furnishing a measure of
stability and protection to children born through such
gestational surrogacy arrangements.43 4
In 2007, the Ohio Supreme Court decided the Surrogate Triplets
case. 4 35 The court held that a gestational surrogacy contract violates no
public policy of Ohio, even when one of the provisions prohibits the
gestational surrogate from asserting parental rights regarding the children
she bears using another woman's artificially inseminated egg.436 The court
acknowledged that "neither the General Assembly nor any other
governmental body in Ohio has ever enunciated a public policy concerning
gestational surrogates.'" 37 But the court resolved the contractual issue by
using contractual norms, noting that "[a] written contract defining the
rights and obligations of the parties seems an appropriate way to enter into
surrogacy agreement,"4 38 as long as the contract is held 'subservient to the
public welfare."'43 9 Three dissenting justices admitted that "whether the
surrogate mother would be considered a parent under Ohio law is not. . . a

434

id.

J.F. v. D.B. (Surrogate Triplets), 879 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio 2007); see Robert E. Rains,
What the Erie "Surrogate Triplets" Can Teach State LegislaturesAbout the Need to Enact
Article 8 of the Unform ParentageAct (2000), 56 CLEvELAND ST. L. REV. 1, 31 (2008).
436 Surrogate Triplets, 879 N.E.2d at 741-42. The court noted the critical difference
between gestational and traditional surrogacy. Id. at 742.
43

37

4

Id. at 741.

id
Id. (quoting Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chi. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 115 N.E.
505 (Ohio 1916)).
438
439
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settled legal issue."44 0 They characterized the surrogacy contract as "an
agreement among unrelated persons for the creation of a child for the
Moreover, they claimed that the decision
payment of money."4'
contravened the state statute442 that barred any person from offering
"inducements to parents to part with their offspring. ""3 The state supreme
court divided four to three, 4" which indicates the lack of consensus in this
critical and sensitive area of the law.
V. THE CHILDREN OF BABYM: SOLVING SURROGACY'S CORE
PROBLEM
The debate between the majority and dissent in the Surrogate Triplets
case, like many similar cases, can appear to be a semantic contretemps
over whether the baby to whom the gestational surrogate gives birth is her
"offspring." 5 But alternative reproduction technologies have destroyed
all previous understandings of parentage. To some extent, the arguments
resemble quarrels between two sides speaking different languages, with
neither comprehending the other. While the existence of sharply
conflicting views is indisputable, their durability is open to question.
Most of the judges who have addressed this issue appear to be
searching for guidance from their respective legislatures rather than
expressing eternal certainties in this rapidly evolving field. Some judges
are willing to employ equitable solutions; others resist. But all sides
acknowledge that the reproductive genie cannot be put back into the bottle
of traditional parentage. While the fundamental right to parent is at the
heart of these cases, almost none of the rhetoric speaks in terms of
immutable rights because the experience of the families so often reveals a
structure at odds with the one envisioned in statutes and case law from an
era whose biological assumptions seem quaint in the twenty-first century.
A 2010 Ohio appellate case, in which "neither of the women who
[were] parties to the surrogacy agreement [were] genetically related to the
child," exemplifies the serious problems facing the courts in this area.6 In
this case, an unmarried woman employed the services of a reproductive
440

4
442

Id at 743 (Cupp, J., dissenting).
Id.

id

443 OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
"4

§ 5103.17 (West 2010).

Surrogate Triplets, 879 N.E.2d at 742 (majority opinion).

4 Id at 743 (Cupp, J., dissenting).
446 S.N. v. M.B., 935 N.E.2d 463, 468 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010), appeal denied 931 N.E.2d

126 (Ohio 2010).

THE CHILDREN OF BABY M.

2011]

403

health center to assist her in locating a surrogate, a sperm donor, and an
egg donor for a gestational surrogate pregnancy." 7 The intended mother
selected the sperm and egg donors and then purchased the donated eggs
Another woman contacted the reproductive health center
and sperm.
expressing her desire to become a gestational surrogate." 9 The center
paired the two women who ultimately entered into a gestational surrogacy
contract. 450 The contract stated, "[A]ny child or children born to Surrogate
as a result of this Agreement will be the Intended Mother's child or
children."45 1 After in vitro fertilization combined the selected donor eggs
and sperm, the resulting embryos were implanted in the surrogate.452 The
surrogate gave birth to twins (one of whom died soon after birth).4 53
Each woman claimed to be the legal mother of the child.454 The
modem-day Solomonic judgment in this case was rendered, not at sword's
point but as an application of contract law. The Ohio Court of Appeals
held that "the presumption [of maternity stemming from giving birth] may
be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of proof of parentage,
including, as in the case of paternity, a voluntary acknowledgement of
maternity."455 The court viewed the surrogacy contract as sufficient proof
of the intended mother's "clear intention to cause the birth of the child and
raise it as her own," thus, demonstrating her "voluntary acknowledgement
of maternity."4 56 Finding this evidence sufficient to rebut the traditional
presumption of maternity, the court held that the intended mother was the
child's legal mother.457
Although "[t]he majority of states with legislation on the subject of
surrogacy make surrogacy agreements void,"45 8 the number of children
born through surrogacy agreements continues to increase. "Despite the
legal uncertainties, thousands of children are born each year pursuant to
7
4
44
'Id.

Id. at 464-65.
at 465.

449 id.
450

id.

451

Id. (quoting the contract).

452

d

453

id

454

See id. at 465-66.
Id. at 470.

455

456
4 57

id.
Id. at 471.

458 D. KELLY WEISBERG, FAMILY LAW CODE, SELECTED STATES AND ALI PRINCIPLES
325 (2008).
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gestational agreements.' 5 9 As Joanna Grossman pointed out, the popular
perception that surrogacy is problematic is mistaken because "the vast
majority of surrogacy arrangements are carried out without a hitch." 6 0
In 2004, the Illinois legislature passed the Gestational Surrogacy Act
(GSA); providing for the enforcement of gestational surrogacy contracts
and declaring that the intended parents automatically become the child's
legal parents at birth.46'
The Illinois law contemplates a pre-birth
registration process rather than a judicial proceeding to establish the status
of the intended parents.462 The Illinois GSA is based on the Uniform
Parentage Act, which authorizes a "prospective gestational mother, her
husband if she is married, a donor or the donors, and the intended parents"
to enter into a gestational agreement.463 Under the Uniform Parentage Act,
a valid agreement must include the following provisions:
(1) the prospective gestational mother agrees to pregnancy
by means of assisted reproduction;
(2) the prospective gestational mother, her husband if she
is married, and the donors relinquish all rights and duties
as the parents of a child conceived through assisted
reproduction; and
(3) the intended parents become the parents of the child.464
The previous uniform act on this subject, the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act (USCACA), had proposed two alternatives: to
regulate gestational agreements through judicial review or to declare

459

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 8 introductory cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 75 (Supp.

2010).
46o Joanna L. Grossman, Time to Revisit Baby M? A New Jersey Court Refuses to
Enforce a Surrogacy Agreement, Part Two, FINDLAw (Jan. 20, 2010), http:// writ.news.
findlaw.com/grossman/20100120.html.
461 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15 (West 2010); see also id. at 47/20(a)(2), 20(b)(2)
(West 2010) (paralleling several other states' surrogacy-enforcement laws by restricting
enforcement to arrangements in which the surrogate has given birth before and the intended
parents have a medical need for the surrogacy).
462 Id. at 47/35 (setting forth requirements for determining how "a parent-child
relationship shall be established prior to the birth of a child born through gestational
surrogacy").
46 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(a), 9B U.L.A. 76.
464 Id. § 801(a)(l)-(3), 9B U.L.A. 76.
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gestational agreements void.465 The new Uniform Parentage Act rejected
that approach, noting in the comment to section 801 that "[t]he scientific
state of the art and the medical facilities providing the technological
capacity to utilize a woman other than the woman who intends to raise the
child to be the gestational mother, guarantee that such agreements will
continue to be written. A66 While some scholars see value in submitting
parentage to contract law,467 formal contracts are often the tools of those
An over reliance on contractual
with greater financial resources."4
formalities may "leave many children-particularly children born to lowerincome families who have fewer resources available to themunprotected.'
Although the contractual approach to parentage moves in the
appropriate direction of validating the child's actual family, it does not
Statutory efforts might
comprehensively deal with the issue.47 o
significantly clarify parenting rights, especially if they are modeled after
the Uniform Parentage Act or the American Bar Association's Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology. 471 Even with statutory
improvements, problems will remain for families who do not fit within
465 Id.
4 66

at art. 8 introductory cmt., 9B U.L.A. 75.

Id. § 801 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 77.

46 See, e.g., Harvey L. Fiser & Paula K. Garrett, It Takes Three, Baby. The Lack of
Standard,Legal Definitions of "Best Interest of the Child" and the Right to Contractfor
Lesbian PotentialParents, 15 CARDozo J.L. & GENDER 1, 20 (2008) (identifying ways that
contracts can "mitigat[e] judicial bias"); Katherine M. Swift, ParentingAgreements, the
PotentialPower of Contract, and the Limits ofFamily Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 913
(2007) (arguing "that properly drafted parenting agreements should be enforced by family
courts").
468 Joslin,supra note 325, at 1221.

469 id.
470 See JANET

L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND
REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE 178-82 (1997) (arguing that by relying on intent in
reproductive technology cases, courts have not been applying contract law; instead, courts
try to avoid pure contract theory in family law cases in order not to subject the family to the
rules of the marketplace).
471 The American Bar Association Family Law Section has included a gender neutral,
marital-status neutral assisted reproduction provision in its Model Act Governing Assisted
Reproductive Technology (ABA Model Act). AM. BAR Assoc., MODEL ACT GOVERNING
AssISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY § 603 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.
org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf ("An individual who provides gametes for, or
consents to, assisted reproduction by a woman as provided in Section 604 with the intent to
be a parent of her child is a parent of the resulting child.").
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formal legal parameters. For nontraditional families who have children
through ART, a workable analogy may be drawn from the "functional"
family norms articulated in the equitable parentage cases.472 The intended
parents in a surrogacy agreement or ART procedure should be treated as
the equivalent of the functional parents in a contested custody case. In
many gestational surrogacy cases, the intended parents made possible the
creation of the child, a child who would literally not exist were it not for
the actions of those parents.
In Johnson v. Calvert,4 73 the California Supreme Court characterized
the actions of the parties to a contested gestational surrogacy case in
functional terms:
Mark and Crispina are a couple who desired to have a
child of their own genetic stock but are physically unable
to do so without the help of reproductive technology.
They affirmatively intended the birth of the child, and took
the steps necessary to effect in vitro fertilization. But for
their acted-on intention, the child would not exist. Anna
agreed to facilitate the procreation of Mark's and
Crispina's child. The parties' aim was to bring Mark's and
Crispina's child into the world, not for Mark and Crispina
to donate a zygote to Anna. Crispina from the outset
intended to be the child's mother. Although the gestative
function Anna performed was necessary to bring about the
child's birth, it is safe to say that Anna would not have
been given the opportunity to gestate or deliver the child
had she, prior to implantation of the zygote, manifested her
own intent to be the child's mother. No reason appears
why Anna's later change of heart should vitiate the
determination that Crispina is the child's natural mother.474
In emphasizing the parties' intentions and behavior, the court suggested
that its role was to validate the reasonable decisions of intended parents
See supra text accompanying notes 312-17.
473 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). The court held that genetic consanguinity and giving birth
are means of establishing a mother and child relationship, but "when the two means do not
coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who intended
to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own-is the natural
mother under California law." Id. at 782.
472

474 id
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This brace of normsand to preserve the resulting family. 475
intention plus behavior-denotes a simple but telling format for
approaching cases of second-parent disputes in gestational surrogacy and
ART cases in general. Intent plus behavior will lead to a finding that
nonparents have become parents, so long as both adult partners manifest
intent plus behavior, and the behavior includes establishing a parent-child
relationship.
In contested gestational surrogacy cases, the intended parents have
typically not had the opportunity to develop a parent-child relationship
with the baby whose birth may have triggered the gestational carrier's
decision to renounce the surrogacy agreement. However, the intended
parents may have done everything possible to become that child's
functional parents. If they have done so, they should be declared the
child's legal parents. Of course, the gestational carrier has her own
functional argument. This argument relies on the fact that for nine months,
she carried the child and then went through the pains of childbirth to
deliver the child. But that contention must be viewed in its proper context.
The surrogate intended to form no family tie with the child. She intended
to be anything but the child's legal parent. Had she not solemnly
expressed her intent to avoid parenthood, she would never have become
the gestational carrier for this child. And until after the birth of the child,
the surrogate in many of these cases did not act in any way to contravene
the understanding that the intended parents were the legal parents.
Katharine Baker observed, "Preconception intent is critical to courts'
allocations of parental rights."476 This preconception intent, coupled with
475

See id.at 786-87.

476 Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity

Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 29, 11 (2004) ("Commentators
and courts widely endorse the preconception intent standard as the appropriate one to
decide disputed parental rights issues stemming from reproductive technologies that allow
people to conceive without intercourse and separate genetic contributions from gestational
ones."); see also Lori B. Andrews, Legal and Ethical Aspects of New Reproductive
Technologies, 29 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 190, 199-200 (1986) (arguing the
preconception intent should govern in cases of artificial insemination); John Lawrence Hill,
What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental
Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 418 (1991) ("[T]he intended parents should be considered
the 'parents' of the child born of [reproductive technologies] . .. ."); Marjorie Maguire
Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunityfor Gender
Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 302 ("[L]egal rules governing modern procreative
arrangements and parental status should recognize the importance and legitimacy of
(continued)
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the intended parents' behavior demonstrating furtherance of their goal to
create new life with the help of a gestational surrogate, establishes that the
intended parents are the baby's functional and real parents. They should
be declared the legal parents.
Preconception intent plus consistent behavior is key. Consider a New
York appellate case presenting a scenario contrasting with that of
Johnson.477 The wife in McDonald v. McDonald was unable to conceive
naturally, and she and her husband agreed to an in vitro fertilization in
which the husband's sperm was mixed with eggs from an anonymous
donor.478 The fertilized eggs were then implanted in the wife's uterus, and
she gave birth to twins.479 The parties later became engaged in a divorce
action and bitterly contested child custody. 480 The husband argued that the
court should award him custody because the twins had no mother, since his
wife was genetically unrelated to them. 4 8' The court ruled that when a
woman gestates and delivers a child formed from the egg of another
woman with the intent to raise the child as her own, the birth mother is the
legal mother.
In McDonald, the wife was the gestational carrier,4 83 but she was
nobody's surrogate.484 She gave birth to a baby to whom she was a genetic
stranger. 85 Yet the court did not doubt that she was the child's legal
mother.486 The New York court found the reasoning of Johnson persuasive
in what the McDonald court termed "a true 'egg donation' situation.'" In
individual.. . intentions .... ). But see Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making:
An InterpretiveApproach to the DeterminationofLegal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REv. 835,
879-80 (2000) (arguing that parental determinations in cases of reproductive technologies
should be governed by existing rules governing parentage determination, many of which do
not honor intent, which would harmonize sexual and technological conception).
477 McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
478 Id. at 478.
479
480

id
d

Id. at 479.
Id. at 480.
483 Id. at 478.
484 See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1036 (8th ed. 2004) (defining surrogatemother as a
"woman who carries out the gestational function and gives birth to a child for another"
(emphasis added)).
485 McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d at
478.
486 Id. at 480.
487
d
481

482
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McDonald, as in Johnson, preconception intent plus consistent behavior
supplied the evidence required for the court to confidently determine
parentage. A case from California, In re Marriage of Buzzanca, also
supports this reasoning.48 8 A husband and wife arranged for a gestational
surrogate to bring to term an embryo genetically unrelated to either of
them. 489 After the fertilization, implantation, and pregnancy, a divorce
action was filed. 49 0 The wife claimed that she and her husband were the
child's lawful parents. 4 9 ' Both the husband and the gestational carrier
disclaimed parentage.4 92 The California Court of Appeals rejected what it
called the trial court's "extraordinary conclusion" that the child had no
legal parents. 4 93 Instead, the court reasoned that the parties' acted-upon
preconception intent meant that the child had come into existence only
because the husband and wife "agreed to have a fertilized egg implanted in
a surrogate."494 The court emphasized that it was not enforcing the
surrogacy contracts in this case but rather was "concerned with the
consequences of those agreements as acts which caused the birth of a
child." 9 ' The intending parents acted consistently with their purpose, and
the court deemed them the legal parents of the resulting child.496
488

In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).

489

Id. at 282.

490

id.

491

Id.

492

id

493

id

494 id
495

Id. at 289.

See McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); see also In
re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005).
496

An unmarried, heterosexual couple had three children by obtaining eggs
donated from an anonymous third-party female, fertilizing the eggs in
vitro with the man's sperm, and implanting the fertilized eggs in the
woman's uterus. The couple intended to rear the children together as
father and mother. When the couple's relationship deteriorated, the
woman filed a parentage action seeking custody and child support. In
response, the man claimed that the woman had no standing as a parent
because, lacking genetic connection to the children, she failed to qualify
as a parent under Tennessee's parentage statutes. On this basis, the man
sought sole and exclusive custody.
Id. at 716. The state supreme court held that the woman is the children's legal mother and
noted that its holding was "tailored narrowly to the specific controversy now before us." Id.
(continued)
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Although this proposed test looks to intention as actuated by behavior,
there is no reason to wait until after the birth of the child. A pre-birth
registration process would be consistent with rational planning, would
reduce uncertainty, and would lead to consistent results. 4 97 The Uniform
Parentage Act provides that if the statutory requirements are met, "a court
may issue an order validating the gestational agreement and declaring that
the intended parents will be the parents of a child born during the term of
the agreement.", 98 As Courtney Joslin pointed out, "Where children are
brought into the world through assisted reproduction, there is necessarily a
convergence of procreative activity and intent to parent; there is no other
reason to engage in that procreative activity." 4 99
Whatever the ultimate legal configuration of parentage for children of
ART, the need to achieve a workable resolution as soon as possible could
not be more pressing. Up to one-third of women who use ART are
unmarried.'"t Chaotic and dysfunctional would accurately describe a legal
system which provides that "in the vast majority of states, children born to
unmarried couples through alternative insemination are excluded from
[established] parentage rules."s'o Whether enacted by a legislature or
developed through the equity power of the courts, a rule based on
at 716-17. The court acknowledged that "Tennessee's parentage and related statutes were
simply not designed to control the circumstances of this case." Id. at 729. But any other
ruling would be untenable:
To restrict legal maternity to genetic consanguinity alone where, as in
this case, the genetic "mother" is an egg donor who has waived her
parental rights and who has been and remains permanently anonymous
would result in the absurdity of children having, for all practical
purposes, no legal mother. Id
See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 364 (Supp.
2010). Alternatives to pre-birth registration include post-birth determination of the
respective parental rights and formal adoption of the child, both of which introduce doubt
and delay into the process. See, e.g., McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 477 (illustrating the
difficulty courts face when trying to determine parental rights). A post-birth determination
of parental obligations might also necessitate the issuance of two birth certificates, one
immediately upon birth and the other after the conclusion of the post-birth procedure. See,
e.g., Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1981) (demonstrating the issuance of two
birth9certificates).
8
4 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803(a), 9B
U.L.A. 364.
499 See Joslin, supra note 325, at 1223.
s'oId. at 1177.
497

s' Id. at 1184.

2011]

THE CHILDREN OF BABY M.

411

preconception intent plus consistent behavior would serve both parents and
children in the new family.
In a world in which family composition depends much more on
function than on blood, the intended parents of a child should be deemed
the legal parents because they are the ones who have done the most to
prepare a family for that child. This article began by considering Baby M,
the seminal case in surrogacy. After more than two decades of legal and
technological changes, "dramatic increases in the number of same-sex
couples having and raising children, and the ever-widening variety of
family forms," it seems difficult to disagree with Joanna Grossman that
"the [Baby M] ruling itself seems dated."502 Baby M may have been
correct in its time, but today we must resolve a new generation of
parenthood issues. The children of Baby M deserve their real parents,
those who assumed the responsibility for bringing them into being.

VI. CONCLUSION
New technologies are colliding with traditional reproductive standards.
The sparks produced from the impact have ignited both resistance and
innovative thinking in the law and policy arena. Years from now, when
the smoke has lifted, future generations will wonder at the sound and fury
emanating from these practices. The one constant in this controversy, the
unchanged and unchanging impetus, is the desire for children and family,
however we choose to create them.

502

Grossman, supra note 460.

